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Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously:
An Analysis of Process in Libel Litigation
SUSAN M. GiLLEs*
This Article addresses a critical problem in libel law: when should
established procedural rules be altered to protect free speech. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that special or modified procedural rules are
necessary to safeguard First Amendment interests. Yet, as Professor Gilles
demonstrates, the Court has failed to articulate a rationale for determining
what procedural rules should apply in libel cases. Instead, it has proceeded on
a case by case basis, granting and denying procedural breaks without
explanation. While the process created by the Court seems highly effective at
safeguarding free speech interests, a second glance reveals that jury error is
rampant, with reversal, remand, and damage reduction rates running at over
70%. Professor Gilles argues that the Court has created a procedural
quagmire which serves neither plaintiffs, defendants, nor the First Amendment.
Professor Gilles then reexamines what we mean by First Amendment
process. She contends that the problems of the current system stem from the
Court's preoccupation with accuracy and its failure to recognize the equally
vital goals of speed and efficiency. Professor Gilles argues that if the Court
adopted a more balanced approach, giving consistent consideration of all three
goals, it could rationalize and improve the process for deciding libel cases.
This Article concludes by offering a number of specific reforms toward that
end.
"[It is important to ensure not only that the substantive First Amendment
standards are sound, but also that they are applied through reliable
procedures. ,,1
I. INTRODUCTION
I have often imagined a debate between Justices Brennan and Black over
the case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.2 It goes something like this. It is
1964. Justice Brennan reads his landmark opinion overturning a libel verdict
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of Glasgow; LL.M., Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank W. Burlette
Carter, Margaret Cordray, Daniel Kobil, Robinson Markus and William Marshall for their
helpful comments and suggestions, and Katharine Mallory, Kevin L. Murch and Jane
Underwood for their research assistance.
I Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994) (O'Connor, J., plurality).
2 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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against the New York imes for its coverage of police reaction to civil rights
demonstrations in Montgomery, Alabama. 3 An Alabama jury had awarded
$500,000 to plaintiff Sullivan, a police commissioner who claimed that he was
defamed by inaccuracies in the description of the conflict. 4
Justice Brennan's opinion is sweeping. He announces that libel law no
longer enjoys "immunity" from First Amendment scrutiny.5 He holds that
public officials cannot recover for libel unless they prove actual malice, that is,
that the publisher knew the story was false or acted with reckless disregard as to
the accuracy of the report.6
As Justice Brennan surveys the jubilant crowd (even law professors are
dancing in the street), he spies the unhappy face of Justice Black. "What's
wrong?" asks Justice Brennan, somewhat perplexed that this long time
supporter of First Amendment freedoms is not celebrating. Justice Black's
response is simple: "It won't work. An Alabama jury will give that police
commissioner money regardless of your fancy fault standard-you require
actual malice, they'll find actual malice. You should have abolished the whole
thing. "7
Justice Brennan responds, "We didn't have the votes to abolish it, but don't
worry, I fixed the jury problem-I raised the burden of proof-the plaintiff has
to prove actual malice with 'convincing clarity.' 8 No jury could say there was
clear and convincing evidence of actual malice here."
3 The report appeared in a full page advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices,"
placed with the New York 7imes by "Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the
Struggle for Freedom in the South." The commissioner also sued four African American
ministers whose names were listed as endorsing the advertisement. See id. at 256. For a
fascinating and comprehensive account of the lawsuit see, ANToNY Lmis, MAKE No LAW,
Tm SuLuvAN CAsE AND THm FIsr AmNDMENT (1991).
4 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256-62.
5 See id. at 269.
6 See id. at 279-80.
7 Justice Black's concurring opinion exudes skepticism:
[tihis record certainly does not indicate that any different verdict would have been
rendered here whatever the Court had charged the jury about 'malice,' 'truth,' 'good
motives,' 'justifiable ends,' or any other legal formulas which in theory would protect
the press. Nor does the record indicate that any of these legalistic words would have
caused the courts below to set aside or reduce the half-million-dollar verdict in any
amount.
Id. at 295 (Black, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 285-86. This standard was reformulated as "clear and convincing" evidence in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
1754 [Vol.58:1753
FIRSTAMENDMENT PROCEDURE
Justice Black smiles, "Sure they could. This jury said that reporting that
demonstrators sang 'My Country, 'Tis of Thee' not the National Anthem,
defamed the commissioner: this jury could find actual malice with convincing
clarity. What's more, the state courts will uphold it."9
Justice Brennan hesitates, but then responds, "Don't worry, we'll change
the procedural rules on that too-we will not remand to a jury, we will
ourselves independently review the record for clear and convincing evidence of
actual malice."10 And that is what the Court did. It never remanded the case for
a jury trial based on the new actual malice standard; rather it performed its own
independent review of the record and concluded that clear and convincing
evidence of actual malice did not exist.'1
I share this imagined exchange, not to demean the two justices-both of
whom I respect immensely for their contributions to First Amendment
jurisprudence-but rather to illustrate that, from the outset, the Court's reform
of libel law presumed that procedural fixes were necessary to protect First
Amendment interests adequately. New York Times not only adopted the
substantive requirement of actual malice, but also switched the burden of
proving actual malice and falsity onto the plaintiff;12 heightened the level of
proof to clear and convincing evidence; 13 and imposed on appellate courts an
9 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
10 See New York Tmes, 376 U.S. at 284-87 (holding that the court must make an
independent examination of the whole record, and finding, upon reviewing the record, that
there was no showing of actual malice against the newspaper or the individual petitioners).
This part of the hypothetical conversation may actually have taken place. See Lnwis, supra
note 3, at 120-21, 172-81 (reporting that the independent review requirement was the product
of negotiations between Justices Black and Brennan, as well as Harlan and Clark, over how to
avoid a retrial).
11 See New York Tunes, 376 U.S. at 286-87.
12 See id. at 279-80 (holding that a public official bears the burden of proof that the
statement was made with actual malice). The Court in New York Times did not expressly hold
that a public plaintiff must also prove falsity, however later opinions treated this as implicit in
its requirement of knowing or reckless disregard of the truth. See Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 75 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) (noting that "[o]ur opinions to date have chiefly
treated the necessary showings of fault rather than of falsity. Nonetheless, as one might expect
given the language of the Court in New York imes .... a public-figure plaintiff must show
the falsity of the statements at issue in order to prevail in a suit for defamation."); Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) (commenting that the plaintiff must "prove a false
publication attended by some degree of culpability"); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74
(1964) (opimg that New York Times requires a public plaintiff to establish that "the utterance
was false").
13 See supra note 8.
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obligation to independently review the record for evidence of actual malice. 14
The debate in New York Times was not over the legitimacy of including these
procedural fixes, but rather on whether these fixes would work or whether libel
should instead be abolished. 15
This Article reviews how First Amendment process has fared since New
York Times. I argue that while the Court has recognized that process is vital to
the protection of free speech rights, the process the Court has created, at least
in the libel area, lacks doctrinal coherence and is ineffective. In Part lI.A, I
seek to demonstrate that, since New York Times, the Court's attitude toward
procedural fixes has varied wildly. Sometimes the Court has willingly
embraced such alterations, sometimes it has expressly rejected them, and
sometimes it has adopted them while denying any alteration has occurred.
Throughout, the Court has failed to explain under what circumstances
heightened procedural protections will be granted in the name of the First
Amendment.
In Part Il.B, I charge that the Court's piece-meal modifications of process
have proved ineffective for protecting First Amendment rights. The section
briefly outlines the progress of a libel suit through litigation under the special
procedural rules imposed by the Supreme Court. I assert that, while on first
glance this process seems an effective means of protecting free speech
(eliminating all but perhaps five to ten percent of plaintiffs' libel suits), closer
inspection shows that the system designed by the Supreme Court is expensive,
drawn out, and fails to protect expression effectively.
In the final section of this Article, Part I, I return to basics, questioning
why we want to create a First Amendment process. I argue that accuracy,
speed, and efficiency should be the goals of such a procedure. Viewed from
this perspective, I contend that the Court's seemingly conflicting decisions can
be explained by an effort to promote accuracy, combined with a failure to
recognize the need for speed and efficiency. The problems of the current
system stem from this excessive preoccupation with accuracy. I argue that if the
14 See supra note 10; see also David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140
U. PA. L. REv. 487, 494 (1991) (In New York Times the Court "greatly expanded judges'
control ofjuries-a development that has had far greater practical effect than the actual malice
rule itself."); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The
Impact of the First Amendment, 66 Thx. L. Ray. 215, 220 (1987) (noting that New York
Times adopted both substantive and procedural reforms).
15 Te decision was unanimous. Justice Brennan writing for the Court adopted the actual
malice rule with procedural safeguards. Justices Black and Goldberg wrote concurring
opinions (both joined by Justice Douglas) urging that public officials be barred from asserting
libel claims, because, in Justice Black's words, the Court's proposed "stopgap measures"
were insufficient to protect free speech. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 295 (Black, J.
concurring).
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Court took a more balanced approach, giving consistent consideration to all
three goals, it could greatly improve the process for deciding First Amendment
cases, and I offer a number of specific reforms towards that end.
I. A CRIcAL ASSESSMENT OF THE COURT'S RECORD iN FIRST
AMENDMENT PROCESS CASES
A. A Lack of Doctrinal Coherence
The Court, to put it bluntly, has been schizoid on the issue of procedural 16
accommodations to protect First Amendment values. As Professor Monaghan
pointed out in his seminal article, First Amendment "Due Process, " even before
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan the Court had raised the idea that the First
Amendment carried with it certain procedural as well as substantive
protections.' 7 In the obscenity area-the focus of Monaghan's article-the
16 As Walter Wheeler Cook told us, and Professor Carrington has reminded us, the
"distinction between substantive and procedural law is artificial. In essence there is none."
Walter Wheeler Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YAiE L.J. 333,
336 n.10 (1933) (cited by Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules
Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 284 n.25). Far from having a constant meaning, the
procedure/substance distinction varies with the purpose it is called on to serve. See Cook,
supra, at 341-43; Carrington, supra, at 287-88.
For purposes of this Article, I have taken a very wide view of procedure, including, for
instance, the allocation of burdens of proof, which under other circumstances the Court has
denominated substantive. See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959)
(citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S.
208 (1939)). This broad view of procedure is similar to the approach taken by Justice
O'Connor in Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994), where she lists as procedural
variations compelled by the First Amendment, alterations in the burden of proof, the quantity
of proof, and the standard of appellate review. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. at 669-70.
17 Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 H v. L. REV. 518, 518
(1970) (observing that the "courts have lately come to realize that procedural guarantees play
an equally large role in protecting freedom of speech" and, in response, have begun to create
procedural requirements unique to First Amendment cases); see also Matheson, supra note
14, at 237-39 (discussing the Court's use of procedure in libel cases).
To some, any variation of process because of the substantive issue at stake is illegitimate,
violative of the trans-substantive principle at the heart of modem civil procedure. The classic
article on this issue is Robert M. Cover, For James W. Moore: Some Reflections on a
Reading of the Rues, 84 YArE L.J. 718 (1975). There are other commentaries, both pro and
con trans-substantivity. See Phyllis Tropper Braumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of
Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in 7Ttle VII Cases, 33 B.C.L.
REV. 211 (1992); Stephen B. Burbank, OfRues and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal
Rules and Common Law, 63 No=R DAME L. REV. 693 (1988); Stephen B. Burbank, The
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Erample of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
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Court openly acknowledged that the First Amendment required process to be
revised to ensure "the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression." s8
However, Monaghan's hope that these cases represented the beginning of an
effort by the courts to "construct a body of procedural law which defines the
manner in which they and other bodies must evaluate and resolve [First
[A]mendment claims-a [F]irst [A]mendment 'due process .. ,-.19 has not
been realized. The Court, far from developing a First Amendment process, has
instead produced a conflicting record, where procedural changes are sometimes
reviled as illegitimate and, at other times, embraced as unremarkable. No
coherent system of procedural safeguards has been developed.20 Libel law, the
1925 (1989); Paul D. Carrington, Malng Rules To Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded
Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137
U. PA. L. REv. 2067 (1989); Carrington, supra note 16; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery
Vices and the Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 2237 (1989); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal
Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991); Gene R. Shreve,
Eighteen Feet of Clay: Thoughts on Phantom Rule 4(m), 67 IND. L.J. 85 (1991); Stephen N.
Surbin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Umformity, Divergence and Emerging
Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1999 (1989); Carl Tobias, The Transformation of
Trans-Substantivity, 49 WAsH. & LEE L. Rnv. 1501 (1992).
18 Monaghan, supra note 17, at 522 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57
(1965)). It is hardly surprising that the author of many of these procedural reforms was Justice
Brennan, also the author of the Court's opinion in New York Times. See id. at 521 (crediting
Justice Brennan with planting many of the seeds from which First Amendment process grew).
19 Id. at 518.
20 See Matheson, supra note 14, at 220-21 (arguing that the Court ignored procedural
issues in libel cases at first, only focusing on them from 1979 on, and noting that the Court
has produced a conflicting series of decisions).
The early cases tended to deal with licensing or other administrative schemes. See, e.g.,
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (viewing the First Amendment as imposing
quasi-judicial requirements on the administrative process, and requiring rapid judicial review
of any administrative determination); see also, JoHN H. GAR EY & FEDE IcK ScHAuER,
Thn Fmsr AMENDMEr: A RnADER 275 (2d ed.) (1996) (noting that "[a]s a general
proposition we may say that the First Amendment worries most about legislative and
administrative actions, and sees the courts as a beneficent influence .... But this assumption
of judicial beneficence does not always hold tre... "); Monaghan, supra note 17, at 520
("Central to [F]irst [Almendment due process is the notion that a judicial rather than
administrative, determination of the character of speech is necessary."). A recent example of
this is Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 677-78 (1994) (holding that the First Amendment
imposed the requirement of an investigation on to the administrative process for disciplining
government employees for their speech). Here the First Amendment functions like Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976), imposing additional process demands on
administrative decisionmakintg.
A second line of cases-the ones this Article focuses on-are cases where the judicial
process is already deemed appropriate, but the Court must consider whether to alter the
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focus of this Article, illustrates the Court's confused approach to First
Amendment process.21
1. The Conflicting Case Law
In libel, the cases can be divided into three categories. The first group
consists of those cases in which the Court, usually led by Chief Justice
Relnquist, has denounced any alteration of procedural rules to meet First
Amendment concerns. The cases include: Calder v. Jones,22 Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc.23-both rejecting any alteration of personal jurisdiction
standards to accommodate First Amendment concerns-and Herbert v.
Lando24-refusing to adopt a privilege that limited discovery of the thought
judicial process to make it more protective of First Amendment concerns. For example,
should the rules on pleading,- discovery, or jurisdiction be altered to make the legal system
more protective of free speech rights.
21 Specifically, this Article looks at cases where the Court has altered or refused to alter
the procedural rules to make recovery easier or harder for libel plaintiffs. It does not examine
cases where the press challenges a procedural protection because it wishes to publish or gain
access to a judicial proceeding. Such challenges range from Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558 (1980) (seeking access to criminal trial) to Craig v. Harvey, 331
U.S. 367, 368 (1947) (restricting use of judicial contempt power when applied to the press).
One case that seems to partake of both categories is Seattle Tnes v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20
(1984). Here the Court held that a newspaper could be barred from publishing information it
obtained as part of discovery in a libel suit. See id. at 37. In one sense, this case illustrates
that the discovery rules will be applied without regard to the First Amendment claim at issue.
Yet, the proposed process change (exempting the press from protective orders) was not a
process variation designed to affect the outcome of the libel case. In fact, the press could have
raised the issue in any case. For this reason, although it is referenced in the footnotes, this
case does not form part of the underlying analysis of the Court's willingness to grant
procedural protections to aid libel defendants.
22 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (entertainer Shirley Jones sued the National Enquirer, its editor
and its reporter in state court in California. The editor and reporter challenged the exercise of
jurisdiction asserting that they lived and worked in Florida. The Supreme Court upheld the
exercise of jurisdiction).
23 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (Kathy Keeton sued Hustler magazine for libel in New
Hampshire, the only state in which the action was not time-barred. The Supreme Court
upheld the exercise of jurisdiction despite the fact that the suits' only connection with New
Hampshire was the scale of 10 to 15,000 copies of Hustler in that state).
24 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (retired army officer-a public figure-claimed a television
network and magazine defamed him by falsely and maliciously portraying him as a liar and a
person who accused his superior officers of covering reports of war crimes as a way of
explaining his relief from military command). The Court refused to adopt a privilege limiting
discovery of the thought process or conversations of reporters and editors when sought by a
libel plaintiff to prove actual malice. See id. at 158-77. The Court took the same stance in
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processes or conversations of reporters and editors when sought by a libel
plaintiff to prove actual malice. 25 The strongest language in this line of
cases26-the "no-accommodation" cases as I will call them-is found in Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Calder: "We have already declined in other
contexts to grant special procedural protections to defendants in libel and
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), when it rejected a claim of a constitutionally
mandated testimonial privilege for news reporters. Although Branzburg was a criminal case,
its logic applies to civil cases. Presumably, in libel suits a reporter may not claim a
constitutional privilege when questioned about a confidential source during discovery, unless
of course there is a state law privilege. Accord Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (holding that a public figure plaintiff was not relieved of the burden of
proving actual malice where the state shield law allowed the reporter to refuse to divulge the
confidential sources of the article, but not reaching the issue of the possible scope of such
laws).
The Court also refused to alter discovery standards in Seattle Tines v. Rhinehart, 467
U.S. 20, 36 (1984), discussed in supra note 21, when it rejected a claim that the First
Amendment required a variation of Rule 26's standard for protective orders.
25 It is possible to read Herbert v. LAndo as willing to adopt some deviation from the
procedural norms to protect free speech interests. While the Court refused to adopt the
privilege sought by the defendant media, at least in the eyes of concurring Justice Powell, it
did not reject the need to accommodate First Amendment concerns when deciding what
discovery should be permitted. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 177-78 (Powell, J., concurring) (Justice
Powell noted that "I do not see my observations as being inconsistent with the Court's
opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional point that, in supervising discovery in a
libel suit by a public figure, a district court has a duty to consider First Amendment interests
as well as the private interest of the plaintiff."); see also Matheson, supra note 14, at 256
(opining that "[n]o Justice [in Herbert v. Lando] disputed that [the] courts should supervise
discovery procedure to accommodate [F]irst [A]mendment concerns... ").
26 There are two other issues on which the Court seems to have taken a no-
accommodation stance: punitive damages and Rule 15's relation back provisions. First, on
punitive damages, the Court denied certiorari when asked to create a due process protection
for newspapers against excessive punitive damages. See Disalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 544
A.2d 1345 (Pa. 1988). The Court later adopted such limitations in all cases. See, e.g., BMW
v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
A second possible example of a refusal to create any special process in First Amendment
cases is Schiavone which interpreted then Rule 15(c)'s relation back provisions, as applied to
a media defendant in a libel case. Although the Court ruled for the press, it did not suggest
that this result was triggered by the First Amendment, but rather by a plain reading of the
then existing language of the nile. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30 (1986). The
Schiavone Court could thus be read as implicitly rejecting any special First Amendment
procedure in this area. Accord Matheson, supra note 14, at 233 n.90 (arguing that a
procedural deviation in such an area would be improper).
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defamation actions in addition to the constitutional protections embodied in the
substantive laws." 27
The message is short and, to First Amendment ears, not so sweet: there
will be no alteration of procedural rules to accommodate First Amendment
concerns. According to these cases, there is no First Amendment process.
In contrast, in a second line of cases, the Court has repeatedly held that the
First Amendment requires special procedures. In Waters v. Churchill, Justice
O'Connor, citing to a long list of libel cases, notes that the Court has "often
held some procedures-a particular allocation of the burden of proof, a
particular quantum of proof, a particular type of appellate review, and so on-
to be constitutionally required in proceedings that may penalize protected
speech." 28 In libel cases the Court has imposed the following procedural
requirements: A heightened level of proof (public persons must present clear
and convincing evidence of actual malice);29 a shift in burden of proof (the
27 Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-91. For criticism of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions in
Calder and Keeton see Matheson, supra note 14, at 257-71.
2 8 Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S 661, 669-70 (1994) (Waters is not a libel case, but
rather concerns the free speech rights of government employees).
29 See New York Times Co. v. Sul'livan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) (requiring public
officials to present clear and convincing evidence of actual malice); Curtis Publ'g Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending the requirement to public figures). In addition, the
clear and convincing standard may apply to other elements of a plaintiff's case. For instance,
the plaintiff may have to show clear and convincing evidence that the alleged libel refers to
her in some recognizable way (the "of and concerning" requirement), and perhaps, falsity,
and the standard may even apply to private figures. See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 779 n.4 (refusing
to address what quantity of proof of falsity a private figure plaintiff must present); Herbert,
441 U.S. at 199 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the clear and convincing standard
applies to virtually all elements of plaintiff's case); see also Matheson, supra note 14, at 244
(noting that the Court has not yet resolved what issues, in addition to actual malice, the
plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence).
Moreover, although the clear and convincing standard is technically limited to public
figure plaintiffs, most private figure plaintiffs elect to seek either presumed or punitive
damages, thus triggering the requirement that they too produce clear and convincing evidence
of actual malice. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (holding that
"the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard
than that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to
compensate him for actual injury"). In practice, the clear and convincing standard is applied
in the vast majority of law suits. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 502-03 (1991) (noting that
"[i]n practice, few suits proceed under the negligence standard, because plaintiffs rarely sue
for actual injury only.... Thus, the full panoply of constitutional rules developed for public
plaintiff cases controls the great majority of libel cases, including those brought by private
plaintiffs").
1998]
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burden of proof of falsity and fault has been shifted to public figure and public
official plaintiffs and to private figure plaintiffs in public issue cases); 30 an
independent appellate review of factual findings on actual malice.31
Sometimes the Court is explicit-it acknowledges that the First Amendment
is the source of a procedural variation. Typical of these cases is Bose, where
Justice Stevens, without even mentioning the "no- accommodation" cases
decided that same term, 32 cited to the First Amendment as requiring special
appellate procedures in libel cases: "The requirement of independent appellate
review reiterated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is a rule of federal
constitutional law." 33
In other cases, the Court is less explicit-it grants a unique procedural
variation only to libel defendants, but does not openly acknowledge that a
30 See New York Thmes, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (holding that the public official plaintiff
must prove falsity and actual malice); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (requiring private figure
plaintiffs to prove some level of fault to recover, at least where speech is on a matter of public
concern); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775, 777 (1986) (holding
that plaintiffs in both public and private figure cases concerning matters of public concern
bear the burden of proof of falsity).
31 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285.
This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principle; we
must also in proper cases review the evidence to make certain that those principles have
been constitutionally applied. This is such a case, particularly since the question is one of
alleged trespass across 'the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech
which may legitimately be regulated.' In cases where that line must be drawn, the rule is
that we 'examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which
they were made to see... whether they are of a character which the principles of the
First Amendment ... protect.' We must 'make an independent examination of the
whole record,' so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden
intrusion on the field of free expression.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491
U.S. 657 (1989); Bose Corp v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511
(1984). For a discussion of the scope and meaning of independent review see infra notes 70-
73 and accompanying text.
32 Bose was decided April 30, 1984. Both Calder and Keeton were decided only a few
weeks earlier on March 20, 1984.
33 Bose, 466 U.S. at 510. In Bose, respondent published an article in its magazine
Conswner Reports evaluating the quality of numerous brands of loudspeaker systems,
including one marketed by petitioner Bose. Bose sued for product disparagement because the
review described its speakers as causing individual instruments to grow to "gigantic
proportions" and "wander about the room." See id. at 487-89; see also, Waters v. Churchill,
511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (majority of the justices "agree that some procedural requirements
are mandated by the First Amendment... ").
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distinct First Amendment procedure has been created. 34 But in all these cases,
whether implicitly or explicitly, heightened procedural protection is treated, not
as heresy, but as an established part of First Amendment doctrine.
In the third group of cases, the Court typically purports to be applying a
general rule of procedure without any deviation due to First Amendment
concerns, but an analysis of the case law strongly suggests that free speech
concerns in fact influenced these decisions. 35 The principal illustration of this
line of cases is the Court's ruling in Anderson v. Libery Lobby, Inc.36 on the
standard for summary judgment. In Anderson the Court announced as a general
rule: (1) that the standard of proof applicable at trial would also be applied at
the summary judgment stage; 37 and (2) that issues of state of mind could be
resolved on summary judgment.38 The opinions show that the Court itself was
divided as to whether it was deciding the case as a matter of special First
34 An illustration is Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). In
Hepps, the Court switched the burden of proof of falsity from the defendant to the plaintiff.
Id. at 777. Neither the majority nor the dissent in Hepps characterized this as an issue of First
Amendment procedure, yet six years later in Waters, Justice O'Connor, the author of both
Hepps and Waters, acknowledged that Hepps was a First Amendment process case. See
Waters, 511 U.S. at 669.
35 These cases are distinguishable from those discussed above where the Court grants a
First Amendment process right, but does so implicitly. In the implicit grant cases, while the
Court does not openly acknowledge that it is creating a unique First Amendment process
right, it does create that process right only in libel cases. In contrast, in the third group of
cases the process rule is applied to all cases-whether founded in libel, wrongful death,
contract, etc.-but analysis reveals that this new "general" process rule is especially
beneficial in libel cases.
36 477 U.S. 242 (1986). In Anderson, respondents, a nonprofit corporation described as
a "citizen's lobby," and its founder, filed a libel action against petitioners, alleging that
certain statements in a magazine published by petitioners were false and derogatory. See id. at
244-45.
Another case which could arguably fit into the category of cases purporting to establish a
general rule of procedure but in fact favoring free speech interests is Bose v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). In Bose, the Court, while admitting that it
was adopting a requirement of independent appellate review dictated by the First Amendment,
also made a valiant, but ultimately unconvincing, effort to argue that this procedural
accommodation was not in conflict with Appellate Rule 52 which dictates a clearly erroneous
standard of review. Id. at 499 (arguing that the conflict is "more apparent than real"); see also
Matheson, supra note 14, at 277-78 (discussing Bose).
37 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 ("[We are convinced that the inquiry involved in a ruling
on a motion for summary judgment... necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary
standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.").
38 Id. at 256 n.7 (clarifying the dicta in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9
(1979)).
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Amendment process. 39 The majority repeatedly stated that they were creating a
general rule not limited to First Amendment cases, and even cited with
approval Justice Rehnquist's "[no] special procedur[e]" admonition in Calder.40
Justice Brennan, in dissent, agreed that this was not a First Amendment case,
but rather concerned the standard for summary judgment in all cases. 41
However, then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent accused the majority of sub silentio
creating yet another First Amendment procedural right.42
Even if we take the majority at their word-that Anderson was not intended
to create First Amendment process-the impact of the case on First
Amendment law is so profound that it seems hard to imagine that the Court did
not recognize the degree of protection which its "general" announcement gave
to defendants in libel cases. First, defendants in libel cases depend on summary
judgment to quickly and (relatively) cheaply dispose of most libel cases. Thus
any ruling which makes summary judgment easier for defendants to obtain is a
significant victory for the press.43 Second, the Court's announcement that the
39 The question of whether the rule is a constitutional one or simply an interpretation of
Rule 56 makes little difference in practice where the case is in federal court, since the lower
federal courts are bound by either. However, in state court the difference is profound, while
state courts must comply with constitutional process, they need not pay any attention to the
federal rules of civil procedure. Accord LDRC Bulletin, Summary Judgment Update Part I,
Summary Judgment Motions in Defamation Actions: 1986-1994 (Issue No. 3, July 31, 1995)
at 7, 23 [hereinafter LDRC SJ Update] (noting that Anderson has created some confusion as
to whether it is a constitutional standard binding on state courts).
40 The Court in footnote 7 repeats with apparent approval, Justice Rehnquist's assertion
in Calder that special procedural protection for libel defendants is disfavored. See Anderson,
477 U.S. at 256 n.7 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-91, which reports [the Court's] "general
reluctance" to grant First Amendment procedural protections).
41 See id. at 257 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (opining that the Court's ruling is not a
First Amendment holding but "changes [the result] for all litigants, regardless of the
substantive nature of the underlying litigation").
42 See id. at 268-69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43 See infra notes 74-76, discussing statistical studies of summary judgment in libel
cases. The Court inAnderson noted that the lower court was skeptical that the higher standard
would produce any difference in results in most cases, but countered that "it could not say that
it would never do so." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254. The dissents of both Justice Brennan, see
id. at 267, and then-Justice Rehnquist, see id. at 269, argued that the decision would have
little practical effect. However, a recent report analyzing defense motions for summary
judgment in libel and related cases against the media from 1980 to 1994 concluded that "in
cases in which the court cited [Anderson v.] Liberty Lobby, Inc. for the requirement that the
plaintiff establish clear and convincing evidence of actual malice at the summary judgment
stage, defendants were far more successful than overall, prevailing on 96.6% of trial court
motions (63 out of 65 motions) and 88.7% of appeals (47 out of 53 appeals)." LDRC SJ
Update, supra note 39, at 2.
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trial burden of proof would apply at the summary judgment stage is particularly
advantageous in libel cases because (unlike the majority of civil suits where a
"preponderance of the evidence" standard applies) this requires most libel
plaintiffs to produce "clear and convincing" evidence to avoid summary
judgment.44 Third, the Court's announcement in Anderson that an issue of state
of mind will not prevent summary judgment, while also articulated as a general
rule, has a far greater impact in a libel case than in a non-First Amendment
case, since actual malice-one of the major bases on which defendants move
for summary judgment-is an issue of the state of mind of the
reporter/publisher. 45 In sum, while the majority's language in Anderson would
justify its categorization as a "no-accommodation" case, an analysis of its
impact indicates that the Court was influenced by the First Amendment issues at
stake, and adopted a procedure highly protective of that interest. 46
Thus, even though procedural accommodations have existed since New
York imes, the case law shows that the Court lacks any consistent approach to
44The Court repeatedly noted that its rule would impose a clear and convincing standard
in libel cases. See, e.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 254, 255. This applies to most libel suits.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
45 In 1979 in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), Chief Justice Burger
suggested that summary judgment for lack of actual malice was not appropriate because the
defendant's state of mind was at issue. See id. at 120 n.9 ("The proof of 'actual malice' calls
a defendant's state of mind into question and does not readily lend itself to summary
disposition."(citation omitted)). This dicta was widely criticized by the media and scholars,
and when Anderson played down the implications of Hutchinson and indicated that sunmary
judgment was appropriate on actual malice issues, it adopted a rule long lobbied for and
especially beneficial to libel defendants. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256 n.7.
46 An opposite reading of the case-that it announced a general rule uninfluenced by the
First Amendment-has some support. First, Anderson was one of three cases announced
during the same term which sought to fundamentally reshape Rule 56--thus giving support to
the view that Anderson is part of a general reformulation of summary judgment standards. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); accord Jack H. Freidenthal, Cases on Sunmary
Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NoTRE DAME L. Rv. 770,
771 (1988) (treating the three decisions as part of a coordinated effort by the Court to provide
a logical frame work for deciding how and when summary judgment should be granted).
Second, the Court in footnote 7 repeats with apparent approval then-Justice Rehnquist's
assertion in Ca/der that special procedural protection of libel defendants is disfavored. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256 n.7 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-91, which reports the Court's
"general reluctance" to grant First Amendment procedural protections). This comment may
however simply be a response to then-Justice Rehnqist's dissent which takes the majority to
task for creating a special First Amendment procedure. See id. at 268-69 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Third, Justice Brennan's dissent indicates that he at least viewed the case as about
summary judgment not First Amendment issues. See id. at 257 n.1.
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the question of when, or even whether, procedural accommodations are
appropriate.
2. A Lack of Rationale
The case law not only reveals a conflict of results, but a surprising lack of
explanation as to when procedural protections will be granted or denied. Since
New York Times, it has been clear that the aim of First Amendment process is
to minimize the chill on speakers (a concept discussed more fully infra), but the
Court has never detailed a test for determining when procedural
accommodations should be granted in libel cases.47 It says yes or no without
47 See also Matheson, supra note 14, at 221 (opining that "[u]nfortunately, the Court has
not defined adequate guidelines to explain when and how courts should further substantive
values by deviating from procedures commonly applied to all types of cases").
If we study the language of the Court's opinions, the only theme that runs consistently
through the cases is a claim that the Court is being loyal to the precedent of New York Times.
Whether the Court is granting or denying procedural protections, it consistently cites to New
York Times. For instance, when holding that no special protections are warranted against
assertions of personal jurisdiction in Cader, Justice Rehnquist expressly argues that to do so
would go beyond New York Tnes. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-91. Likewise, Justice Scalia,
noting that the Court has "been most circumspect about acknowledging procedural
components of the First Amendment," contends that such procedural accommodations are
simply "elaborations upon the limitation on defamation suits first announced in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan." Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 686-87 (1994).
In the cases where the Court has approved procedural accommodations, the Court has
also been careful to note the origins of such a process in New York Times. Thus, both Justice
O'Connor in Hepps and Justice Stevens in Bose expressly argue that the procedural
protections they are recognizing can be traced to New York Times. See Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 771-76, 778 (1986); Bose v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 508-11, 514 (1984).
The Court has not only repeatedly cited to New York Times, but an overview of the
cases' results lends some support to the thesis that the Court (even though not acknowledging
that this is its goal) may be trying to limit process accommodations to those originally granted
in New York Times. New York Times guaranteed independent review of constitutional facts.
The Court continued this in Bose, 466 U.S. at 510, and in Harte-Hanks Communications,
Inc. v. Connaughton, 191 U.S. 657, 688-89 (1989). New York Times shifted the burden of
proof on falsity and fault, and the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347
(1974), and Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775, has applied this shift in burden to private figures. New
York Tnes imposed a clear and convincing standard for proof of actual malice, and the Court
has remained steadfast to this commitment, see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342, although it has
prevaricated on whether to extend such protection to proof of falsity, see Hepps, 475 U.S. at
779 n.4.
The Court's no-accommodation cases can also be viewed as an attempt to adhere to New
York Tmes. New York Times never said there was any special procedural protection on
questions of personal jurisdiction, see New York Times, 376 U.S. at 255 n.25-26 (refusing to
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much explanation. In fact, even when the Court creates a heightened procedural
protection in a First Amendment case, the Court often denies that such an
accommodation is being made,48 or is otherwise less than forthright about its
action.49 This lack of rationale was openly acknowledged by Justice O'Connor
in Waters v. Churchill, a case focusing on the free speech rights of government
consider the defense's challenge to personal jurisdiction on grounds of mootness), or on
discovery issues; and, to date, the Court has refused to adopt such procedural rights. See
Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-91 (personal jurisdiction); Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176-77 (discovery).
Thus, the cases can be portrayed as a simple adherence to the precise guarantees of New York
Times.
However, the argument that New York Times explains the Court's process decisions
faces two problems. First, the Court's adoption of procedural innovations in the summary
judgment case of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), does not seem to
conform to this explanation. New York Tines did not suggest that any alteration in the
summary judgment standard was appropriate. Second, it is questionable if either the personal
jurisdiction or the discovery cases can be explained as outgrowths of New York Times. Those
protections were not granted in New York imes because they were not considered by the
Court. Thus, it cannot be regarded as even persuasive precedent on either issue.
Furthermore, the main problem with using New York Tmes as the key to the Court's
conflicting First Amendment process cases is the Court's inability to decide what that case
stands for. Both the dissent and the majority repeatedly claim that New York Tmes is on their
side. Thus, while the Court may be united in its feeling that New York Tmes contains the
answer as to when process should be created, the Court cannot agree on what that answer is.
An illustrative case is Herbert, where Justice White, writing for the majority, supported his
refusal to create an evidentiary privilege by citing to New York Rimes and its progeny and
asserted that "these cases [do not] suggest any First Amendment restriction on the sources
from which the plaintiff could obtain the necessary evidence." Herbert, 441 U.S. at 160. In
dissent, Justice Marshall argued that First Amendment restrictions on discovery should be
recognized and that the majority misreads New York imes: "[alithough professing to
maintain the accommodation of interest struck in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [the
majority] is unresponsive to the constitutional considerations underlying that opinion." Id. at
202 (citation omitted). Thus, the one thread of consistency in the Court's decisions, and the
closest it comes to a general rationale, is a repeated citation to New York Times, even though
the Court is unable to decide what that case means in any particular application. I suggest in
Part III that the Court's repeated reliance on New York Times is a reflection of its
unacknowledged focus on accuracy as the main value underlying First Amendment process.
48 See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), discussed in notes
40-41 supra, where the majority denied that they were creating any special First Amendment
protection.
49 See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), discussed
supra note 34. The Court has been equally tight lipped when it denies requested procedural
protection. Then-Justice Rehnquist's repeated statement that the Court has previously rejected
"special procedural protections" tends to distort the case law by denying the procedural
accommodations that have been granted, and is devoid of an explanation as to why no
protections are warranted. See, e.g., Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-91; see also Matheson, supra
note 14, at 268 (criticizing Justice Rehnquist's opinion as being founded in "half truths").
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employees.50 Justice O'Connor admitted that although a majority of the Court
"agree[s] that some procedural requirements are mandated by the First
Amendment, and some are not[,] [n]one of us have discovered a general
principle to determine where the line is to be drawn." 51 Instead, she suggested
the Court "reconcile [itself] to answering the question on a case-by-case basis,
at least until some workable general rule emerges." 52 As I will suggest in Part
III, the goals of a First Amendment process should be speed, efficiency, and
accuracy. Further, I will argue that the Court's decisions seem to have
promoted only one of these goals-accuracy. At this point it is sufficient to note
that the Court's decisions are in conflict and that the Court has offered no
general rationale to explain when it will grant a procedural variation to promote
free speech.
B. An Ineffective Process?
The Court's decisions on First Amendment process can be criticized not
only for their lack of doctrinal coherence, but also for their failure to effectively
protect free speech interests. To assess effectiveness, we must start by
reviewing the procedural path of a typical libel suit,53 as modified by the
Supreme Court.
1. The Procedural Path of a Libel Suit
The first stage in a libel lawsuit is pleading. The Court has never been
asked to grant, nor has it ever suggested that there may be, any constitutional
50 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994). Writing for four justices, Justice
O'Connor recognized that a government employee engaged in speech had a process right
which required the government to investigate with "the care that a reasonable manager would
use before making an employment decision." Id. at 677-78 (citation omitted).
51 Id. at 671.
52Id.
53 Some procedural protections apply to all public issue libel cases (e.g., the switched
burdens of proof of fault and falsity). Other protections (for instance, the clear and convincing
standard and appellate review) may only apply to cases where actual malice is at issue. See
supra notes 29-31 and infra notes 70-73 (discussing the confusion as to the breadth of these
procedural protections). These "actual malice triggered" protections always apply to public
person cases. However, as at least one author has noted, most private plaintiffs seek
presumed or punitive damages, thus they also trigger the actual malice standard and all the
related procedural protections. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 502; supra note 29. Thus, the
"typical" libel plaintiff has to prove actual malice and enjoys all the procedural protections
created by the Court. This section discusses such a plaintiff.
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process guarantees that affect the pleading stage of a libel suit.54 While some
states require a libel plaintiff to plead the actual words of the alleged
defamation, there is no such constitutional requirement. 55 The states are free to
fashion the pleading rules as they wish. They can require a plaintiff to provide
lots of details or simply require general notice of the libel claim. The Court has
also rejected the idea that special protection should be granted when the media
challenges a plaintiff's suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.56 Thus, at the front
end of a law suit no First Amendment procedural protections have been
granted.
The next stage is discovery. In libel suits, discovery typically focuses on
three main topics: the truth of the alleged libel (unless falsity is conceded); the
fault of the newspaper (whether under a negligence or actual malice standard);
and the damages claimed by the plaintiff. Discovery can take from months to
years and is expensive.57 The discovery almost always requires extensive court
intervention to resolve motions to compel and requests for protective orders.58
54 At least one lower federal court has suggested that specificity in pleading in First
Amendment cases is constitutionally required. See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San
Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd., 542 F.2d 1076, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 1976); accord,
Bargen v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1154, 1154 (1983) (citing Franchise Realty).
Another federal court has suggested that such a requirement is favored as a matter of federal
policy. See Asay v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 594 F.2d 692, 698-99 (8th Cir. 1979); Pinto v.
International Set, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 306, 309 (D. Minn. 1986); Provisional Gov't of New
Afrika v. A.B.C., 609 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C. 1985). However, the Supreme Court has
never addressed pleading requirements in libel cases. It did recently reject a trend to impose
heightened pleading rules in § 1983 cases. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
Of course any time the Court changes the substantive law of libel, it necessarily impacts
pleading. For instance, when the Court held that fault was a required element in every libel
case, even in notice pleading states, the plaintiff must now plead that the defendant acted with
negligence or actual malice.
55 Some states as a matter of state law require the actual words of the alleged defamation
to be specifically pleaded. See infra note 180. In addition, some states have retraction statutes
which may require plaintiffs to request a retraction before filing and may also impose special
pleading requirements. See id. There is no such constitutional retraction requirement,
although it has formed an element of many proposed statutory reforms of libel. See, e.g.,
Rodney A. Smolla, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal, reprinted in REFORMING LMEL
LAw 229 (J. Soloski & R. Bezanson eds., 1992).
5 6 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770 (1984). Such motions typically occur at the outset of a law suit.
5 7 See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
58 Both the defendant media and the plaintiff can prove reluctant to produce requested
information. See, e.g., James H. Hulme & Steven M. Sprenger, Vindication Reputation: An
Alternative to Damages as a Remedy for Defamation, reprinted in REFORMING LIBEL LAw
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Despite the enormous importance of discovery to the law suit, this step is
also devoid of constitutional protections. In Herbert v. Lando, the Court
rejected a claim that the work of editors and journalists should be exempt from
discovery, or even subject to a heightened showing before discovery was
allowed. 59
The next stage in any libel suit is almost always a defense motion for
summary judgment. In the vast majority of libel cases, either during or at the
end of discovery, the defendant moves for summary judgment, usually on a
variety of grounds: privilege, lack of proof of falsity, opinion, and almost
always, lack of proof of actual malice. 60 Here, for all practical purposes, the
Court has granted a procedural variation to protect First Amendment values,
because in Anderson it emphasized that summary judgment was appropriate on
the issue of actual malice, and that to survive a defense motion a plaintiff must
produce clear and convincing evidence of malice. 61
In addition, all the alterations of burdens of proof (switching the burden of
fault and falsity to the plaintiff) have aided defense requests for summary
judgment. 62 Now, to win summary judgment, the defendant need not disprove
fault or falsity but may simply point to a plaintiff's inability to prove either.63 If
162 n.134 (John Soloski & Randall Bezanson eds., 1992) (noting that in Westmorkand, there
were three plaintiffs motions to compel).
59 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979). But see id. at 180 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (arguing that even when applying general discovery rules, the trial courts "must
ensure that the values protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to no constitutional
privilege in a case of this kind, are weighed carefilly in striking a proper balance"); see also
supra note 25.
60 For a discussion of the grounds on which defendants move for summary judgment,
see LDRC SJ Update, supra note 39, at 18-22 (recording the basis and success rate of
motions for summary judgment from 1990-1994) which is discussed more fully infra note 74;
see also PLI, Libel Litigation 1992, at 137-203; DONALD M. GniMoR, POWER, PUBLiTrY
AND THE ABUSE OF LmEL LAW 138-40 (1992) [hereinafter GILumOR, PoWER] (discussing
success rates for motions based on actual malice, negligence, truth, and opinion).
61 See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of Anderson in
libel cases).
62 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (on burden shifts).
63 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1982); accord Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-23, 325 (1982) (holding that a defendant moving for
summary judgment need not produce any evidence to disprove an element of the plaintiffs
case, but need only point out to the court the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party's (plaintiff's) case). Rule 56 "mandates" the entry of judgment "against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial .... The moving
party is 'entitled to judgment as a matter of law' because the nonmoving party has failed to
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the plaintiff cannot come forward with clear and convincing evidence of fault
and falsity, the suit is dismissed.64 Summary judgment then is the site of the
first set of procedural accommodations granted to libel defendants.
Presuming the case survives summary judgment, it will go to trial.65 The
Court has constitutionally mandated certain procedural protections at the trial
stage. Once again, the burden of proving both fault and falsity has been shifted
to the plaintiff and the level of proof on certain issues has been raised to a clear
and convincing standard. 66 Instructions to the jury inform them of these
heightened proof requirements. Equally, defendants who move the trial court
for a directed verdict, JNOV, and new trial also benefit from the shifted
burdens of proof and the clear and convincing standard.67 Thus, the trial stage
carries considerable procedural breaks for the typical libel defendant.
But it is post trial that First Amendment procedure begins to dominate.
Almost all libel trial verdicts are appealed.68 If the plaintiff prevails, an appeal
usually triggers the Bose requirement that the appellate court independently
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has
the burden of proof." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
64 See id. As discussed supra in notes 29 and 53, although technically only applying to
public plaintiffs proof of actual malice, the necessity of recovering punitive damages force
even private plaintiffs to meet the clear and convincing proof of the actual malice standard.
65 The number of trials in libel and related cases against the media in 1996 was 14. This
compares with a low in 1995 of 8 trials. Libel Defense Resource Center, Damages Survey,
LDRC Bulletin No. 1 (Jan. 1997), at 1, 4 [hereinafter LDRC 1996 Damages]. Previous years
saw the following numbers: 1994 had 17 trials; 1993 had 26; 1992 had 13; 1991 had 25; and
1990 had 19. The average number of trials per year in the 1990s is 17.4, compared with just
under 25 per year for the decade of the 1980s. The LDRC actually tracks libel and "related"
cases (including, for instance, privacy cases). Thus, the number of solely libel cases may be
lower. However, because the report focuses only on suits against the "media," the actual
numbers of libel suits may be higher. See id. at 1 (describing the scope of the report).
66 See supra notes 29-30 (discussing the shift in the burden of proof and the "clear and
convincing" requirement).
67 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254 (clear and convincing applies to directed verdict
motions).
68 See GLLMOR, POWER, supra note 60, at 137. Of 122 jury verdicts for plaintiffs and
defendants, 111 were appealed at least one level, 28 were appealed another level, and 2 were
appealed a third time. See i. As percentages, this shows that almost 91% of all libel jury
verdicts were appealed, 22.9% of them through at least two levels of appeal. If we look only
at defense appeals of plaintiffs' verdicts, Gillmor reports that of the 122 cases in his study
which went to trial, plaintiffs won 90, of which 86 were appealed (i.e., 95.5% of plaintiffs'
trial verdicts were appealed). See id.
The LDRC studies report a decrease in the number of cases appealed (rather than settled
or not appealed) inthe 1990s compared to the 1980s. In the 1980s only 6.65% of plaintiffs'
verdicts were paid without appeal, versus 16.7% so far in the 1990s. See LDRC 1996
Damages, supra note 65, at 3, 8.
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assess the record for clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.69 This
heightened standard of judicial review is triggered in each successive appeal.
The exact stringency of Bose is not clear: it may require an independent review
only of actual malice; it may also apply to findings of falsity, negligence, the
opinion/fact distinction, "of and concerning the plaintiff," and even defamatory
content;70 it may mandate de novo review; it may require deference to the
69 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964); Bose v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984).
70 The Court in Bose applied the independent review standard to a finding of actual
malice, as the Court did in New York 7mes. See supra notes 10, 33, and accompanying text.
In addition, the Court in New York Thmes arguably applied independent appellate review to
"of and concerning." See 376 U.S. at 288.
However, the language in Bose implied that independent review might be required any
time a question of First Amendment protection was at stake. See, e.g., Bose, 466 U.S. at 505
(noting that the Court "has regularly conducted an independent review of the record both to
be sure that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected category and to
confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an
effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited"). Since the requirement that
plaintiffs prove negligence, falsity, defamatory meaning, and "of and concerning" are all
constitutionally mandated, it is arguable that these too require independent scrutiny. The
lower courts are divided on these issues: on application to falsity, see, e.g., Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987); Locricchio v.
Evening News Ass'n, 476 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1991); Deaver v. Hinel, 391 N.W.2d 128
(Neb. 1986); on application to negligence, see, e.g., Levine v. CMP Publications, 738 F.2d
660 (5th Cir. 1984); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Ane, 458 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1984); Jadwin v.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 1985); Landsdowne v. Beacon
Journal Publications Co., 512 N.E.2d 979 (Ohio 1987); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d
713 (Va. 1985); on "of and concerning," see, e.g., Deaver v. Hinel, 391 N.W.2d 128 (Neb.
1986); on defamatory meaning, see Dodson v. Dicker, 812 S.W.2d 97 (Ark. 1991); Dixon v.
Ogden Newspapers, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 237 (W. Va. 1992); and on award size, see Fleming v.
Bedford, 325 S.E.2d 713 (Va. 1985).
Several courts have applied the independent review standard outside of the libel area.
See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay and Lesbian Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 567 (1995) (applying independent appellate review to the question of whether petitioner's
activity was protected speech; Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 265, cert. granted, judgment vacated, 116 S.Ct. 2519 (1996) (Bose
applied to factual findings on status of homosexuals); Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d 1435, 1441
(10th Cir. 1990) (applying independent review to the issue of whether a location was a public
forum); Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051, 1053 n.9 (11th Cir.
1987) (applying independent review to commercial speech issues); Lindsay v. City of San
Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying independent review to
commercial speech issues); Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1986)
(applying independent review to the constitutionality of a statute restricting speech in a public
forum); Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 839-40 (1985) (applying independent review to a
government employee speech case; cf. Planned Parenthood Ass'n/Chicago Area v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1228-29 (7th Cir. 1985) (refusing to apply independent review
1772 [Vol.58:1753
FRST AMENDMENT PROCEDURE
jury's factual findings (especially on credibility);71 it may apply to appeals by
both parties or only to defense appeals;72 and finally it may apply only to
to an appeal of a transit authority's refusal to rent advertising space); see also, Robert E.
Keeton, Federal Influences on the Treatment of Law and Fact in Tort Litigation, 55 MD. L.
REv. 1344, 1346-53 (1996) (discussing the use of independent review). Indeed, in Bose, the
Supreme Court cited its prior decisions on fighting words, incitement to riot, obscenity, and
child pornography as illustrative of cases where the Court had a constitutional responsibility to
exercise independent review. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 503-08. Moreover, in New York imes
itself, the origin of independent review in libel cases, Justice Brennan implied that the
requirement already existed for certain types of speech such as obscenity. See New York
Tnies, 376 U.S. at 284-85.
For an extensive review of the lower courts' readings of Bose, see Libel Defense
Research Center, Ten Year qf Appellate Review in Defamation Cases from Bose to
Connaughton to the Present, LDRC Bulletin No. 2 (Apr. 1994) [hereinafter LDRC, Ten
Years of Appellate Review]; Alice N. Lucan et al., Defining Appellate Review: Bose's
Problems and Opportunities, in LmEL LmGAnON 1988, 311 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 252, 1988); Anderson,
supra note 14, at 495-98.
71 The Court's language in Bose was again confused. At points it referred to the standard
of review as "de novo review" requiring "an independent examination of the entire record."
Bose, 466 U.S. at 499, 508 n.27. At other times, the Bose Court suggested deference to the
fact finder was required, especially on issues of credibility, and that the review was not de
novo. See id. at 499-500, 514 n.31. The Court provided some limited clarification in Harte-
Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989). The Connaughton Court
implied that even with independent review, the appellate court must take as given facts which
were undisputed and those which the jury "must have" found. Id. at 690-91. It also rejected
the idea that reviewing courts should reassess credibility, holding that such jury findings were
only subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. See id. at 688. However, the Court
continued to repeat that independent review required a consideration of "the factual record in
full" and included an examination of "the statements at issue and the circumstances under
which they were made." Id. at 688. As one commentator has observed "whatever the Court
means by 'independent review,' there is no doubt that it invites judges to set aside jury
determinations." Anderson, supra note 14, at 495. The LDRC study of appellate reversal
rates, discussed in depth infra, found no diminution in reversal rates after Connaughton, but
noted that confusion as to the meaning of the standard was still prevalent in the lower courts.
See LDRC, Ten Years of Appellate Review, supra note 70, at 2, 16-18.
72 The Supreme Court has never decided the issue of whether independent review is a
"one way street." The lower courts are split. Some courts have reasoned that it would be
impossible to apply a different standard depending on which party was appealing at that time.
See, e.g., Bartimo v. Horseman's Benevolent & Protection Ass'n, 771 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.
1985). Other courts have argued that since the Bose standard is designed to protect errors
which chill free speech, it is only available in appeals by the defense from pro-plaintiff
verdicts. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767
F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985) ('mjunction on sale of advertisement case); Brown v. K.N.D.
Corp., 529 A.2d 1292 (Conn. 1987). For discussion of the split in the case law, see LDRC,
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appeals from trial verdicts, although some courts have held it applicable to
appeals from grants of summary judgment.73 However, at a minimum, it is
clear that when the defense appeals, the appellate court must review the record
anew to ensure that it is satisfied that clear and convincing evidence of actual
malice exists.
This is First Amendment process in the typical libel case: no protections at
the initial pleading and discovery stages, but with ever-increasing safeguards
from summary judgment through trial to appeal.
2. An Evaluation of the Process
At first glance this process seems to work. If we accept that the goal of
First Amendment procedural innovations is to protect free speech, the Court
has been remarkably effective. It has granted summary judgment protection,
and studies have consistently found that between 70% and 80% of defense
motions for summary judgment are granted, a very high rate when compared to
other civil cases.74 This high success rate on defense summary judgment
Ten Years of Appellate Review, supra note 70, at 4-5; Lucan et al., supra note 70, at 347-57;
Anderson, supra note 14, at 498.
73 Since appellate review of grants of summary judgment is traditionally de novo, the
Bose standard should have no effect. However, some courts have expressly held the
requirement of independent review applicable to summary judgment appeals, and one study
found a higher defense victory rate where the courts applied the Bose standard. See LDRC SI
Update, supra note 39, at 23-24.
74 The most comprehensive report on summary judgment in libel cases is the LDRC SI
Update, supra note 39. This report summarizes the data gathered in previous reports (a 1980-
1986 study and a 1986-1990 study) and sets out newly collated data from 1990 to 1994. See
id. The LDRC SJ Update, however, reports only on claims against the media and includes
both libel and "related" cases (particularly privacy claims). However, its figures are the
closest we have to reflecting what is going on in libel cases in the United States.
The LDRC SJ Update reports that during the entire period covered by the report (1980-
1994), defendants obtained summary judgment at the trial court level on 82.2% of their
motions. See id. at 13. The report finds that another 3.5% of cases saw a partial grant of
summary judgment, leaving only 14.3% of cases where defense motions for summary
judgment were denied in entirety. See id. at 13. The study found defense success rates to be
almost the same in state and federal courts (82.9% in state court and 83.5% in federal court
for the 1986-1994 time period) and to vary slightly between the federal circuits. See id. at 13-
14.
The study also breaks down the success rates by the substantive basis for the motion. For
the 1986-1994 period, actual malice-based motions were successful 81.6% of the time;
negligence-based motions were successful 60.9% of the time; opinion-based motions were
successful 79.6% of the time; substantial truth-based motions were successful 80.7% of the
time; falsity-based motions were successful 79.7% of the time; privilege-based motions
(including qualified, absolute, common law or statutory, but not fair comment, fair report or
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motions has been sustained over fifteen years and may even be rising.75
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest a correlation between the Court's
decisions and the high defense success rate. In cases where the trial court cited
to Anderson, there is an even higher defense summary judgment rate.76
At the trial stage where the Court has granted some protections (in
particular, by altering the burden of proof and the evidentiary standard) libel
defendants fare less well, winning only four of fourteen trials (28.6%) during
1996. 77 Plaintiffs not only usually win at trial, they usually win big. For 1996
neutral reportage) were successful 53.1% of the time; fair comment-based motions were
successful 50% of the time; fir report privilege-based motions were successful 73.6% of the
time; neutral report privilege-based motions were successful 62.5% of the time; defamatory
meaning-based motions were successful 77.4% of the time; "of and conceming"-based
motions were successful 75 % of the time; republication-based motions were successful 73.7%
of the time; statute of limitation-based motions were successful 78.3 % of the time; and other
motions (for instance retraction, libel proof, libel per se) were successful 71.4% of the time.
See id. at 18-21, tbl. 16.
Other studies report similar findings although in less detail. See, e.g., GLLMOR, POWER,
supra note 60 at 135-36 (study of reported public person cases against the media between
1982 and 1988, finding that defendants won 90.8% of the cases decided by summary
judgment); Marc Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Libel Litigation, 1980
AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 455 (reporting a success rate of 68% for the media on pre-trial actual
malice motions).
The success rate reported in all these studies may be very exaggerated since all focus
mainly or exclusively on reported decisions and most denials of summary judgment are
unreported because the trial court issues no written opinion. Thus, denials of summary
judgment are probably undercounted in all these studies, leading to reports of artificially high
defense success rates. See LDRC SI Update, supra note 39, at 13 n.7 (noting that in states
with no interlocutory appeals, denials are unreported, leading to an artificially high success
rates for defendants). Comparative data on the success of summary judgments in tort cases
generally (expressed as the number of successful motions as a percentage of motions made) is
not available. However, a nationwide tort study of tort case dispositions found that only 1.7%
of all tort cases were terminated by summary judgment. See Steven K. Smith et al., Tort
Cases in Large Counties (Apr. 1995, NCJ 153177) at 3 (tbl. 2).
75 See LDRC SJ Update, supra note 39, at 1 (reporting that defendants obtained
summary judgment at the trial level at an increasing rate in each of the three time periods
studied, specifically 79.5% for the 1980-1986 period; 79.9% for the 1986-1989 period; and
86.7% the for 1990-1994 period). As discussed, these grants are overwhelmingly upheld
when appealed. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
76 See LDRC SJ Update supra note 39, at 2, 23 (noting that in cases where the court
cited Anderson's requirement that the plaintiff produce clear and convincing evidence at the
summary judgment stage, the defendants were successful in 96.9% of trial court motions);
supra note 43 and accompanying text.
77 See LDRC 1996 Damages, supra note 65, at 1, 4, 5, tbl. lb (these figures are for
libel and "related" cases (including, for instance, privacy claims) against media defendants).
This figure appears to reflect a decline in trial court victories beginning in 1995. For 1996 and
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the average jury award was over $3 million, and the median jury award was
over $2.3 million.78 These loss rates appear to be far worse than those for other
tort actions. 79 Post trial motions (for new trial, remittitur, and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict) have limited success. 80
However, the Court's procedural innovations pay off at the appellate stage
where defendants once again win at staggering rates. For instance, where
defendants have won summary judgment below, the appellate courts
overwhelmingly uphold such judgments, affirming trial court grants of
1995, the figures were almost identical, with the defense winning 28.6% and 29.2% of trials
respectively. See id. This was a sharp decline from the media's 45.9% success rate of 1992-
1993, a 38% success rate for 1990-1991, and a 35.8% success rate for the decade of the
1980s. See id. at 4, 5, tbl. lb. Gillmor reports a similar rate (media defendants were
successful in only 26.2% of cases which went to trial) in his survey of reported cases from
1982-1988 by public plaintiffs against the media. GILLMOR, PoWER, supra note 60, at 137.
78 See LDRC 1996 Damages, supra note 65, at 5, thl. 2 (these figures are for libel and
"related" cases (including, for instance, privacy claims) against the media defendants). If both
jury and bench trial awards are included, the average award for 1996 is $2,822,716 and the
median is $1,252,500. See id. Once again, it is important to put these most recent statistics in
perspective, especially since the 1996 figures contain the Food Lion punitive damages award.
The average damages figures have fluctuated widely (in part because of the small number of
cases), reaching an all time high in 1990-1991. In 1990-1991 the average overall award (jury
and bench trials) was over $6.9 million, dropped drastically in 1992-1993 to $821,843, only
to rebound somewhat to the $1.247 million figure for 1994-1995, and $2.82 million for 1996.
See id. at tbl. 2a. The median award shows similar variations: in 1990-1991, it was
$375,000, in 1992-1993, it was $272,500, increasing in 1994-1995 to $500,000, and to
$1,252,500 in 1996. Id. at tbl. 2a. Libel damages seem to go in cyclical patterns, making
predictions difficult. However, 15 years of LDRC data show a continuous increase in average
and median damage awards. See id. at thl. 2 (showing increases in both awards for the 1990-
1996 time period when compared with the 1980-1989 time period). One change underlying
these statistics is the increase in large awards (over $1 million or more). See id. at 2.
79 The data on trial success rates for defendants is relatively limited. However, data
from the Rand Foundation and the Jury Verdict Research Series suggest that success rates for
media defendants in jury trials were far worse than success rates for defendants in medical
malpractice and products liability suits. See LDRC 1996 Damages, supra note 65, at 15
(comparing defense success rates for the 1990s); see also Smith et al., supra note 74, at 5
(reporting that defendants won 74% of medical malpractice cases that went to trial).
80 For 1996, no defense JNOV motions were granted, 11.1% of defense remittitar
motions were granted, and 11.1% of new trial motions were granted. See LDRC 1996
Damages, supra note 65, at thl. 3a (these figures are for libel and "related" cases (including,
for instance, privacy claims) against media defendants). This compares with the 1994-1995
period during which the figures were: 6.3% for JNOV motions granted, 6.3% for remittitur
motions granted, and no new trial motions granted. See id. These figures represent a
significant decline in the success of JNOV motions when compared with the 1980s, but
represent an increase in the success of new trial motions. See id. at 8, tbl. 3a.
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summary judgment in almost 75% of such appeals.81 In contrast, where the
trial court has denied defense motions for summary judgment and defendants
appeal, the denial of summary judgment is affirmed in only 33.7% of
appeals. 82
Similar figures apply to appeals of trial verdicts. A ten-year study of
appeals (1984-1994) found that the defense was successful in obtaining a
complete or partial disturbance of pro-plaintiff judgments in more than seven
out of ten appeals. Put another way, even when plaintiffs win at trial, 71.7% of
appealed awards are ultimately reversed, remanded, or modified in defendants'
favor.83 In an incredible 41.3% of appeals, the defense obtained an outright
reversal of the plaintiff's trial court victory.84 In an additional 14.1% of
appeals, the appeals court reversed the plaintiff's judgement, but remanded for
a new trial. Even when defendants do not obtain a reversal, they see the
damage awards drastically decreased. For instance, in an additional 16.3% of
appealed cases the damages are reversed or reduced. 85 Plaintiffs' verdicts
81 See LDRC SJ Update, supra note 39, at 15-16, (reporting that appellate courts
affirmed grants of summary judgment in 74.2% of appeals during 1980-1994 (these statistics
are for libel and related claims (including, for instance, privacy cases) against media
defendants); see also GmIMOR, POWER, supra note 60, at 137 (reporting that on first appeal,
76.8% of appeals of defense summary judgment grants were upheld, and at the second level,
of the relatively few which were appealed, 76% were upheld).
82 See LDRC SJ Update, supra note 39, at 15-16. These statistics do not differentiate
between jurisdictions which allow interlocutory appeal of denials of summary judgment, and
the vast majority which permit an appeal of a denial of summary judgment only after a final
judgment has been entered, usually after trial. For further discussion of interlocutory appeals,
see infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
83 LDRC, Ten Years of Appellate Review, supra note 70, at 1 (these figures are for libel
and "related" cases (including, for instance, privacy claims) against media defendants). Other
studies yield similar figures. See, e.g., GILLMOR, POwER, supra note 60, at 137-38
(reporting that the 90 cases where plaintiff won at trial, 86 were appealed; only 35 were
upheld on appeal, 16 with remittiturs; when 15 of these 35 were appealed to the next appellate
level, seven more were overturned; a third appeal led to one more reversal).
84 See id. at 1 (this represents 38 out of the 92 judgments).
85 See id. at 1, thl. 1 (these figures are for libel and "related" cases (including, for
instance, privacy claims) against media defendants). Of the 16.3%, 6.5% are reversals of the
punitive award, 2.2% are reversals of the compensatory award, and 7.6% are affirmances
with remittitur. See id. This appellate revisiting of damage awards causes a great disparity
between the amounts awarded at trial and the amounts plaintiffs recover. For instance, for the
1990s, while the initial trial court awards averaged over $899,612, as finally affirmed, the
average fell to $555,759. See LDRC 1996 Damages, supra note 65, at tbl. 2g (these figures
are for libel and "related" cases (including, for instance, privacy claims) against media
defendants). Other studies have found similar figures. See, e.g., Gn.moR, POWER, spra
note 60, at 137 (reporting a mean average payment of $504,000 in 1982-1988 public person
versus the media reported cases).
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survive intact in only 28.3% of appealed cases. 86 If we look only at appellate
courts' consideration of the question of actual malice, independent review takes
an even starker toll on plaintiffs' trial court victories: when independent review
was applied, appellate courts reversed pro-plaintiff judgments on the issue of
actual malice in 66.7% of appealed cases.87 It is hardly surprising that
defendants almost always appeal, given these high success rates. 88
Thus, the First Amendment procedural protection crafted in Bose seems to
be a remarkably effective tool for protecting First Amendment interests. It
called for stringent appellate review to protect speech and it has produced
incredibly high reversal rates of pro-plaintiff verdicts. There is even some
empirical evidence which suggests that the Bose requirement of independent
review is the cause of these reversals. The 1994-1995 LDRC report found that
the rate of outright reversals in favor of defendants was much higher, in fact
was more than double, when the court applied independent appellate review.89
Perhaps one statistic best reveals the power of Bose's requirement of
independent appellate review: when appellate courts applied independent
These reversal rates can be compared with those reported in a one year study of the
federal appellate courts' decisions in civil cases where there was a challenge to the sufficiency
of evidence supporting a jury verdict. See Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries: Appellate
Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 237, 246-47. Schnapper reports an
appellate disturbance rate of 49% (this included partial reversals). See id. The rates for
disturbance of plaintiff verdicts was considerably higher (at 52.5%), than the rates for
disturbance of defense verdicts (at 23 %). See id. at 250.
86 See id. at 1, tbl. 6 (these figures are for libel and "related" cases (including, for
instance, privacy claims) against media defendants).
87 See id. at 1, tbl. 6 (these figures are for libel and "related" cases (including, for
instance, privacy claims) against media defendants). This figure is for appeals when
independent appellate review is applied. Even if we look at all appeals on the actual malice
issue, including those where it is not clear if independent appellate review is applied, the
outright reversal rate is still 51.95%. See id. at tbl. 6 (calculated from combining figures).
8 8 See supra note 68 (estimating an over 90% appeal rate from all verdicts and a 95%
appeal rate by defense from pro-plaintiff trial verdicts).
The success rate of appeals taken by plaintiffs from trial verdicts in favor of defendants is
more in line with the norm. There are fewer plaintiffs' appeals. For example, of 112 appeals
decided in the 1984-1994 appellate review, only 20 were taken by plaintiffs. See LDRC, Ten
Years of Appellate Review, supra note 70, at 1 (these figures are for libel and "related" cases
(including, for instance, privacy claims) against media defendants). Plaintiffs obtained
complete reversals in only 20% of their appeals, and of these, half were overtumed at a later
stage. Id. at 2, thl. 3.
89 See id. at 1 (reporting that the outright reversal rate was 53.7% in cases where
independent appellate review was applied, but only 23.7% when it was not). Independent
review also decreased the number of outright affirmances of plaintiffi' verdicts. See id. (these
figures are for libel and "related" cases (including, for instance, privacy claims) against media
defendants).
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appellate review to the issue of proof of falsity, the courts reversed 83.3% of
the time; when the courts applied the usual standard of "clearly erroneous,"
they reversed 8.3 % of the time. 90
When looked at in combination, the impact of the Court's First
Amendment process is striking: between 70% and 80% of all defense motions
for summary judgment are granted. Of the suits which remain, plaintiffs lose
about a third of them at trial. And of those cases that plaintiffs win at trial, the
victory is usually short lived-an appeal is almost certain and 70% of defense
appeals see pro-plaintiff trial verdicts reversed, remanded, or modified. 91
Studies have repeatedly reported that only 5%, and up to perhaps 10% of
plaintiffs who file suit, ever recover.92 This picture seems to reflect well on the
Court's efforts to protect free speech. The very stages of litigation which the
Court has altered procedurally to protect free speech, summary judgment and
appellate review, eliminate the vast percentage of plaintiffs' claims.
3. A Second Glance
While at first glance the Court's procedural protections seem highly
effective, a second look causes one to question this conclusion. First, one of the
largest costs in a libel case is discovery. It is easy to cite the exceptional cases
such as Herbert v. Lando (where Lando's 26 volume-3,000 page-deposition
continued intermittently for over a year)93 or Westmoreland (where the total
legal fees are estimated to be around $10 million and the plaintiff's discovery
on actual malice alone involved the detailed depositions of fifteen reporters,
90 See id. at 1 (these figures are for libel and "related" cases (including, for instance,
privacy claims) against media defendants). The same gulf appears when the issue is
defamatory meaning. If the appellate court applies independent review there is a 75% reversal
rate. If instead it concludes that the clearly erroneous standard applies, there is a 0% reversal
rate. See id. The split in the lower courts as to whether independent appellate review applies
to issues such as falsity and defamatory meaning is discussed in supra note 70.
91 See supra notes 68, 75, 77, 83.
92 See David Anderson, Who Needs Libel Reform?, 338 PLI Libel Litigation 1992, 639,
642 (1992) (opining that "[u]lltimate success rates for media libel defendants are upwards of
ninety percent, probably the highest of any identifiable class of tort defendants"); Marc A.
Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CAL. L. REV. 809,
838 (1986) (citing a 5% chance of the defendant suffering defeat); accord Marc A. Franklin,
Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 795, 803 (1981); see
also Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record
Straight, 71 IowA L. REv. 226, 228 (1985) (citing a less than 10% success rate for plaintiffs
in court); GILMOR, POWER, supra note 60, at 168 (reporting that in his study, 93% of
plaintiffs lost).
93 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 n.25 (1978).
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researchers, editors, and production personnel).94 However, even in a run-of-
the-mill libel case, the cost of discovery is high.95 In addition to the obvious
costs (attorney fees, court reporter, transcription, document production, and
copying costs), are the hidden costs, for instance, the loss of journalists' and
editors' time as they are pulled away from their duties to search for documents,
meet with attorneys, and attend depositions. 96 Thus, much of the cost of
94 See Westmoreland v. C.B.S., 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Pierre N. Leval,
Commentary, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its Proper Place, 101
HARv. L. REv. 1287, 1295 (1988) (reporting high costs and fifteen depositions); GIlMoR,
POWER, supra note 60, at 21 (citing a $10 million figure reported in RENANTA ADR,
RECLESS DISRGARD (1986)); see also Rosell L. Wissler et al., Resolving LibelDisputes Out
of Court: Libel Dispute Resolution Program, in REFORMING LBmEL LAw, 286-87 (John
Soloski & Randall P. Bezanson eds., 1992) (reporting that the estimated defense costs in the
Westmoreland case "ran about $6 million"). Other multi-million dollar defense cases are
Sharon v. Time Magazine Inc., 103 F.R.D. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (cited in Wissler et al.,
supra estimating costs at $6 million), and Wayne Newton v. N.B.C., 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir.
1990) (cited in GLLMOR, PowER supra, note 60, at 130 reporting a $9 million defense cost).
These are figures for the entire litigation process, including discovery, motion practice, trial,
and appeal(s).
The high cost of defense has been repeatedly noted by scholars. See David A. Barrett,
Declaratory Judgment for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REV. 847, 858 (1986)
("IThe costs of defending libel suits have risen substantially. Lawyers' fees and expenses,
together with indirect expenditures of personnel time, have escalated to the point that winning
a suit may be as costly as losing."); Anderson, supra note 14, at 488 ("[E]ven the least
meritorious cases can require extensive discovery on both sides"). Of course the media is
usually insured both as to litigation cost and as to damages from an adverse verdict. See idL at
547-48 (attributing the media's lack of interest in reform as in part driven by the availability
of insuance).
95 Estimates of legal fees for the typical libel case vary. See, e.g., GnLMOR, POWER,
supra note 60, at 20 (citing American Society of Newspapers Editors estimate of a minimum
cost of defending a libel suit at $95,000; to the insurance carriers estimate of $150,000; and to
one scholar's estimate of $200,000, with appeals to the United States Supreme Court doubling
that amount); see also Wissler et. al., supra note 94, at 318 n.11 (citing a 1980s report of
defense legal fees identifying libel suits as generally costing between $200,000 to $500,000).
One author, using 1980s costs, estimated that the cost to get to the summary judgment
stage was $225,000 with a further $25,000 of costs to prepare the motion itself. See
GLMOR, PowER, supra note 60, at 20, 130 (citing M. Garbus, The Many Costs of Libel,
230 Puuusfms WxLY. 13-16 (1986)).
96 As one commentator has observed: "it is hard to conceive of any legal rule that would
involve the courts more deeply in [the editorial] process than the actual malice rule does."
Anderson, supra note 14, at 516 (detailing the scope of intrusion into the editorial process
entailed in any libel lawsuit); see also Barrett, supra note 94, at 847, 858 ("Mhe time and
energy expended by management and news staff in defending a suit can be enormous.
Reporters and editors often have been effectively transferred to the publisher's legal staff,
forced to work full time on their own legal defenses.") (footnote omitted).
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defending a libel suit has already been incurred by the time the first
constitutional protection, an enhanced summary judgment standard, kicks in.
Perhaps equally disturbing, the courts may well be failing to grant summary
judgment as often as they should. Only 33.7% of denials of defense motions for
summary judgment are affirmed on appeal. 97 This suggests that a high
proportion of defendants who have endured the expense of a trial (recall that
defendants move for summary judgment in nearly all cases) should have been
granted judgment as a matter of law. Thus, while the Court's reform of
summary judgment does eliminate many plaintiffs' claims, it does nothing to
remedy the high cost of discovery, and statistics suggest that groundless claims
do survive, at least through trial.
The Court's reform of the trial stage can also be criticized. Trial remains
extremely time consuming and costly (both in legal fees and reporters' and
editors' time). Moreover, as noted above, the procedural protections grafted on
to the trial stage have had little impact: plaintiffs consistently win and win big. 98
Justice Black's warning in New York Times, that no "different verdict would
have been rendered here whatever the Court charged the jury about 'malice,'
'truth,' 'good motives,' 'justifiable ends,' or any other legal formulas which in
theory would protect the press," 99 seems to have proved true.
The final troublesome feature of the libel litigation process is evident when
we focus on the appellate stage. Over 71% of pro-plaintiff verdicts which are
appealed are disturbed, and of those, 41.3% are reversed outright. 1°° When
pro-plaintiff judgments on the issue of actual malice are appealed and subjected
to independent review, over 66% are reversed. 10 1 On one hand these rates
speak well of the impact of Bose. Yet these figures also point to an incredibly
high error rate in the system. This means that in at least 40% of appealed pro-
plaintiff verdicts, the trial resulted in the wrong outcome. This number jumps to
over 66% if we focus only on cases where independent appellate review is
97 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
98 One could argue that this high pro-plaintiff trial victory rate seems a justified reaction
to the summary judgment rates. After all, if 70% to 80% of defense motions for summary
judgment are granted, presumably the remaining cases are the strongest plaintiff cases and
repeated high verdicts would be appropriate. See LDRC 1996 Damages, supra note 65, at 4
(noting a continuing fall in defense success rates at trial and positing that this may be related
to the decrease in cases actually going to trial). But this explanation is negated by the reversal
rates. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. To put it plainly, the plaintiffs are
winning a large number of cases, which as a matter of law the appellate courts say they
should be losing. See id.
9 9 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295 (1963) (Black, J., concurring).
100 See supra notes 83-87.
10 1 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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applied to actual malice. Such high error rates are hardly the mark of an
accurate trial process. To put it plainly, the appellate reversal rates tell us that a
lot of cases are coming out the wrong way at trial.' 02 Moreover, the high
reversal rate is not simply an indication that the trial stage is proving highly
inaccurate, but also demonstrates the inefficiency built into the process the
Court has designed. A system with a high appellate reversal rate is a system
that is inefficient both in terms of cost and time. Appellate reversals come only
after both the defendant and the plaintiff have gone through the costs of
pleading, discovery, summary judgment, trial, and appeal. In addition,
appellate reversals come only after the judge, the jury, and the courtroom have
been tied up for weeks of trial time, and at least one level of appellate court has
read briefs, heard oral argument, and deliberated. 103 Yet appeals are a certainty
in almost every case. 104
How great is the cost of a system which is so inaccurate that it almost
guarantees an appeal, and perhaps, multiple appeals? It is difficult to estimate
an exact figure of the cost of appeals. Again, one can cite to the estimated $10
million spent by CBS defending the Westmoreland case,105 or the $9 million
spent by the libel insurer defending Wayne Newton's suit against NBC (both
figures are for the entire case including appeals).' 0 6 Even if we look for the
typical libel case, 1980s estimates were running at between $95,000 and
102 The reversal rates reported by LDRC are stated as a percentage of appealed cases,
not as a percentage of pro-plaintiff trial verdicts. For example, of plaintiffs' victories which
are appealed by the defense, 41% are reversed outright. Thus, the 41% reversal rate does not
indicate that trial courts are getting the wrong result as a matter of law in 41% of trials. Some
cases where the plaintiff wins at trial may be settled prior to appeal---and arguably (since the
defense knows the high appellate reversal rates) the ones which are settled are those in which
the plaintiff has the strongest case. Following this logic, the number of erroneous results at
trial level (expressed as a percentage of total trials) is probably less than 41%. However, the
number is probably fairly accurate. The data gathered by Gillmor does indicate that, as we
would expect, given the high reversal rates, most cases where the plaintiff wins at trial are
appealed. See GuILMOR, POWER, supra note 60, at 137. He reports that of the 122 cases in
his study which went to trial, plaintiffs won 90, and 86 of these were appealed. See i. Cf.
LDRC 1996 Damages, supra note 65, at 3, 8 (discussed in note 68 supra, noting an increase
in settlement prior to appeal in the 1990s). Thus the number of pro-plaintiff judgments
appealed is probably fairly close to the total number of pro-plaintiff trial judgments.
103 See Matheson, supra note 14, at 283-84 (arguing that while appellate review
corrects erroneous judgments, it "comes too late" to address the most serious problems with
the actual malice standard).
104 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (estimating an over 95% appeal rate from
pro-plaintiff trial judgments).
105 See GaLMOR, POWER, supra note 60, at 21 (citing ADLER, supra note 94). Other
estimates are set out in supra note 94.
106 GalMOR, POWER, supra note 60, at 130.
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$200,000 per case, but the figures doubled if an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court was added on.' 07 One figure consistently reported is that legal
fees constitute as much as 80% of the aggregate costs of defense, with court
costs and damage awards constituting the remainder. 10 8 Plaintiffs, usually
proceeding on contingency fee arrangements, spend less.109
The process as it currently functions is not only costly, but also long.
Because the defense's main protections are in the appellate process, ultimate
resolution of cases can take almost a decade. 110 Cases are almost always
appealed, often several times, and a remand will usually trigger another trial
and a second set of appeals."'
To be frank, the Court's effort to create a First Amendment process has
been largely a failure. The Court's First Amendment process decisions conflict
and lack any explanation of when procedural variations will be granted. We
have a frequently erroneous, high cost, slow moving system that serves neither
plaintiffs, defendants, nor the public. 112 We need to re-examine when and why
107 See id. at 20.
108 See RODNEY A. SMOLiA, SUING THE PREss 74-75 (1986). Gillmor reports similar
data from insurance cariers. See GILLMOR, POWER, spra note 60, at 130-31 (noting that
80% to 85% of monies paid out by the insurance companies in libel cases went for defending
libel suits, only the remaining 15 % to 20% were spent on damages).
109 See Randall P. Bezanson et al., The Economics of Libel: An Empirical Assessment,
in TIm COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND PoUCY IMPIuCATIONS 23-34 (Everette E. Dennis &
Eli M. Noam eds., 1989) (reporting that a 1980s study of plaintiffs discovered that most
plaintiffs spend less than $5,000 in litigating, that two-thirds of plaintiffs are offered some
type of contingency agreement, and that 16% of libel plaintiffs in the survey had no litigation
costs and 30% spent less that $3,000). C. Anderson, supra note 14, at 542 (estimating that in
high profile cases such as Tavoulereas, Wayne Newon, and Westmoreland, plaintiffs' legal
fees can be in excess of $1 million).
110 GT.TMOR, POWER, supra note 60, at 24-31 (citing the length of litigation in a series
of public person libel suits in the 1980s, including McCoy v. Hearst, 727 P.2d 711 ,(Cal.
1986) (eight years appellate process) and Costello v. Capital Cities Communication, 532
N.E.2d 790 1l. 1988) (nine years appellate process)). Gillmor's study which reviewed all
reported cases in the Media Law Reporter for 1982-1988 concludes that a majority of cases
(59.2%) take three or fewer years to complete; 38.7% take four to nine years to complete;
and 2.2% take more than nine years to complete. See GILmOR, POWER, supra note 60, at
143, 214 (tbl. 14). These figures may be an underestimation of the time taken as Gillmor
includes as "final" cases in which appeals may still be pending. See id. at 143; see also
Anderson, supra note 14, at 510 (noting that "[c]ases that turn on actual malice sometimes
continue for ten or fifteen years").
I11 See GILLMOR, POWER, supra note 60, at 137 (reporting that almost 91% of all libel
jury verdicts were appealed, 22.9% of them through at least two levels of appeal), 68
(discussing the breakdown of the 91% statistic).
112 As one commentator has noted, summarizing his research:
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we will grant procedural accommodations to promote First Amendment values
to see if we can design a more rational and effective set of procedural
safeguards.
IH. RECONSIDERATION AND REFORM
In this section, I return to the basic question of what we want a First
Amendment process to achieve. First, I identify basic process goals; that is, the
goals we would want any procedural system to strive for. Then I question how
these goals should be modified considering that we are designing a process that
must be especially solicitous of First Amendment interests. 113 I argue that the
three goals of a First Amendment process should be accuracy, speed, and
efficiency. I posit that the Court's decisions have promoted only one goal-
accuracy-and that the problems of the current system stem from the Court's
pre-occupation with this goal and its failure to recognize the equally important
goals of speed and efficiency. I conclude by urging the Court to adopt a more
balanced approach, giving consistent consideration to all three goals, and offer
a number of specific reforms towards that end.
Nearly 55 percent of cases involving summary judgments and motions to dismiss and
more than 90 percent of cases involving jury trials reached the first appellate level; most
cases ended there with defendants winning more than two thirds of the time. Therefore
vast amounts of time and money are expended in suits that will eventually be won by
more than 70 percent of defendants in this study, and in other studies, with no apparent
benefit to public discourse.
As it stands today, libel law is not worth saving. What we have is a system in which
most claims are judicially foreclosed after costly litigation. It gives plaintiffs delusions of
large windfalls, defendants nightmares of intrusive and protracted litigation, and the
public little assurance that the law favors truth over falsehood. If we can do no better,
honesty and efficiency demand that we abolish the law of libel.
GILLMOR, POWER, supra note 60, at 168. See also Anderson, supra note 14, at 489.
113 The Court has refused to outline when it feels that procedural accommodations
should be granted to protect free speech, instead reconciling itself "to answering the question
on a case-by-case basis... until some workable general rule emerges." Waters v. Churchill,
511 U.S. 661 (1994). Waters is discussed in supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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A. Free Speech and Process Goals: Congruence and Conflict
In all litigation, libel or otherwise, the interests at stake are those of both of
the parties and of the legal system itself.114 The typical goals of a procedural
system are well illustrated by the announced aims of the federal rules: "the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 115 Process should be
"inexpensive," in other words, economically efficient for both parties and for
the judicial system itself, and it should also be "speedy" so parties' rights are
vindicated effectively. Equally, the system must be "just," in the sense that it
should be "accurate." An accurate process seeks to ensure that the right result
is reached on the merits of each case. 116
However, if we are designing a First Amendment process, the process
must be structured to protect speakers and to ensure that they are not deterred
from speaking for fear that they will be unjustly subject to suit. 117 Often, the
procedural characteristics required to protect speech are identical to the general
procedural goals we have outlined above. For instance, both First Amendment
values and process values are served by the speedy resolution of a suit. The less
time cases take to be resolved, the less time journalist and editors will be pulled
away from their jobs to aid their lawyers in litigation and the less time they will
be exposed to the unease which is inevitably triggered by having a multi-million
dollar claim pending against them.118 Thus, speedy resolution of libel disputes
is a goal of both process and the First Amendment. 119
114 By the interest of the legal system, I mean the public's interest in having a system
that effectively resolves disputes in an economical fashion.
115 FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Cf., Matheson, supra note 14, at 228-31 (defining the goals of
process to be fairness and efficiency-meaning accuracy, minimum cost, and predictability-
but arguing that procedure should not be used to "ignore or amend substantive law"). Thus,
Matheson would create a presumption against formalizing special procedural rules for
substantive areas.
116 The right to a just process has a constitutional dimension since it is the essence of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "due process of the law." Yet as one commentator has
noted, while the constitutional dimensions of criminal procedure have been repeatedly
explored by the Court and commentators, the constitutional aspects of civil procedure have
largely been ignored. See generally John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 Tx.
L. REv. 579 (1984).
117 For a discussion of this chilling effect, see infra notes 123-30 and accompanying
text.
118 See supra text accompanying notes 94-96 (detailing the enormous time and energy
spent by journalists and editors in defending libel suits).
119 Plaintiffs would also be aided by the speedier resolution of cases. Most plaintiffs
fault the current system for delay and would like a speedier resolution. See RANDALL P.
BEzANSON Er AL., LmEL LAw AND TEm PRss: MYrH AND REALITY 178 (1987) ("While, as a
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Efficiency should also serve both process and First Amendment ends. First
Amendment goals should be served by an inexpensive process because the
cheaper the process of defending a lawsuit, the less a speaker will fear litigation
and the less that speaker should be "chilled." 120 Numerous scholars have now
recognized that the high cost of defending libel suits itself imposes a significant
chilling effect. 121 Thus, an efficient, inexpensive process would seem to further
both process and First Amendment goals. 122
The conflict in goals comes when we ask what it means for a First
Amendment process to be accurate. The rationale underlying all First
Amendment process is the desire to create a process that will minimize the
chilling effect-that will prevent speakers from being deterred from speaking
for fear of liability. 123 We "over" protect speech so that speakers will not be
deterred.124 To develop an effective First Amendment process it is therefore
group, the plaintiffs stated that they were aware from the outset that the litigation process
could be prolonged, they were never the less frustrated by the extent of time consumed, and
the number of levels of judicial action.").
12 0 It is true that if costs to plaintiffs decrease, there may be an increase in the mmber of
suits filed and this may increase the chill on potential defendants, because if it costs little to
litigate, plaintiffs may be encouraged to file frivolous suits. See Rodney A. Smolla, The
Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal, in REFORMING LmBL LAw 263-64 (John Soloski &
Randall P. Bezanson eds., 1992) (arguing that the press is not willing to give up actual malice
in return for a declaratory judgment action, despite the cost of litigating actual malice, because
of fear of an increase in frivolous suits); see also, Anderson supra note 14, at 542-46
(arguing that the media as a repeat player in libel litigation is willing to incur large legal costs
to ensure victory, effectively pricing plaintiffs out of the case and concluding that "it is
entirely possible that media fear the chill of expensive litigation less than they fear the chill of
more frequent accountability"). However, if the costs of both sides decrease, the defense
should benefit because 80% of current defense costs of libel are from litigation expenses. See
supra text accompanying note 108 (on litigation costs).
12 1 See supra notes 94, 96 and accompanying text; infra note 131 and accompanying
text.
122 Once again, an inexpensive process also meets plainiff' needs, although plaintiffs'
litigation costs are estimated to be far lower than defense costs. See supra note 94, 109 and
accompanying text.
123 See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the
"Chilling Effect", 58 B.U. L. Rnv. 685, 685 (1978) (noting that the "chilling effect concept
has been recognized most frequently and articulated most clearly in decisions chiefly
concerned with the procedural aspects of free speech adjudication").
124 If this were our sole goal, then we could devise an even more protective First
Amendment process. For instance, we could adopt a rule that every plaintiff must produce
clear and convincing evidence of actual malice within 3 days of filing their complaint or
summary judgment would be granted. Such a rule would clearly decrease chilling effect.
Potential libel defendants could count on a high rate of dismissals for relatively little cost. Yet,
I would suggest that we would reject this rule because it denies the plaintiff a fair opportunity
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essential to understand what we mean by the chilling effect, and how much of
that effect we are prepared to tolerate. The Court has told us that some chilling
effect is good. Those who would tell a knowing or reckless lie are not,
according to the Court, contributing to public debate. 125 In fact their falsity
harms that debate by misleading the public on vital issues. Thus, libel law is
intended to chill or deter the intentional or reckless liar. 126
Yet if we allow libel law to chill the intentional liar, the danger is that
others, who seek to announce the truth, will be deterred from speaking. This
begs the question: why should those who seek to speak the truth be deterred by
a law which punishes those who intentionally lie? The answer is because a legal
system may err.127 If we had a perfect process, we could guarantee to any
speaker that if she did not intentionally or recklessly lie she would have nothing
to present their claim on the merits. Instead, the Court has been attempting to devise a process
which eliminates the chilling effect without denying the plaintiff a fair hearing. For instance,
rather than the rule on summary judgment suggested above, the Court in fact held that while
summary judgment for lack of evidence of actual malice should be favored, it would be
appropriate only after the plaintiff had an opportunity to conduct discovery. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1985).
125 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 769 (1985)
(White, J., concurring) (criticizing the New York Times test because it leaves falsity
undetected and the public's "information about public officials and public affairs is polluted
and often remains polluted by false information"); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171
(1978) (noting that the New York Times test is supposed to chill the dissemination of false
information); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1975) ("[Tjhere is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error
materially advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust and wide-open' debate on public
issues.").
126 See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 171.
12 7 As Professor Schauer has pointed out in his classic article on the chilling effect, the
degree of chill a speaker will experience depends on "the probability of an erroneous verdict
times the harm produced by such a verdict." Schauer, supra note 123, at 695. Such errors can
flow from mistakes of law, errors in the fact-finding process, and from the personal
prejudices of the judge or jury. See id. at 694-95. Professor Schauer notes the uncertainty in
the legal process:
In all litigation, and indeed the entire legal process, is surrounded by uncertainty. The
interplay of human witnesses, jurors, judges and lawyers coupled with the imprecision of
"people-made" rules guarantees that there will be little in the realm of litigation of which
we can be sure; thus, the ability to predict accurately the outcome of any adversary
confrontation is by no means a process in which we can maintain a high degree of
confidence. Given this overriding uncertainty, errors of different kinds can occur.
Id. at 687; see also, Matheson, supra note 14, at 231-32, 236-37 (discussing errors in legal
process).
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to fear. It is because our system contains a likelihood of error, that speakers
may remain silent or be "chilled." 128
Thus, in one sense the goal of a free speech process-accuracy of result-is
the same as the general process goal. Yet this similarity hides a profound
difference: process abhors any inaccuracy, be it pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant.
In contrast, in free speech process, the concern is principally with errors that
penalize the defendant speaker. 129 If a plaintiff erroneously has her law suit
dismissed, there will be no chill on speakers. In fact all speakers, including the
intentional liars, will be encouraged. In contrast, when one who speaks the truth
is erroneously found liable and forced to pay damages, other truth speakers will
be chilled. From a First Amendment process perspective then, we want to
eliminate the chance of plaintiffs erroneously recovering (pro-plaintiff error),
far more than we fear defendants erroneously escaping liability (pro-defendant
error).
Thus, a First Amendment process shares certain common goals with all
processes, in particular a desire to resolve disputes speedily and efficiently.
Where it parts company is the meaning of a "just" resolution. The general
process goal is to minimize errors whether pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant. In a
First Amendment process, the key to the third goal-accuracy-is to minimize
pro-plaintiff errors.
128 This brings us back to the debate between Justices Brennan and Black in New York
imes with which I started this Article. Justice Brennan recognized the chill that the potential
for error created, noting that "critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of
doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so." New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). However, he argued that he could
effectively decrease the chill on truth speakers, or give them a breathing space, if he built in
sufficient substantive and procedural protections. Justice Black believed that whatever the
protections, error would occur as long as libel law existed, and abolition was the only
solution. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
129 See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971) (Justice Brennan
noted that "we view an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff as most serious. Not only does it
mulct the defendant for an innocent misstatement ... but the possibility of such
error.., would create a strong impetus towards self censorship, which the First Amendment
cannot tolerate"); see also Schauer, supra note 123, at 688, 704 (explaining that the chilling
effect doctrine mandates the formulation of legal rules "that reflect our preference for errors
made in favor of free speech").
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B. Reassessing the Court's Efforts to Create a First Amendment Process
1. An Obsession with Accuracy?
In light of these three goals-accuracy, speed, and efficiency-we can now
reassess the First Amendment process created by the Court. My thesis is
simple: the Court has ignored speed and efficiency, and focused, almost
exclusively, on accuracy. The flaws in the current system largely reflect this
doctrinal error.
As is clear from our previous analysis, the Court's current process for
deciding libel suits woefully fails to meet two of the identified goals-speed and
efficiency. Instead, the process is slow moving and costly. The Court's
decisions do not simply fail to promote these two goals, but have actively
undermined them. For instance, it is now clear that chill on speakers comes not
just from fear of damage awards, 130 but also from concern about the costs of
litigation. 131 Yet while the Court in New York Times acknowledged the
potential chill created by litigation costs, 132 it did nothing to address them and
may even have caused an increase in these Costs. 133 New York Times's adoption
of a fault standard opened up an entirely new avenue of discovery, into the
130 'Me New York Times was faced with a verdict of $500,000 which (when combined
with suits by other Alabama officials) threatened to bankrupt it. See New York Times, 376
U.S. at 294-95 (Black, J., concurring) (noting multiple suits then pending against the New
York Times); LEwis, supra note 3, at 35 (discussing the suits' potential impact on the imes'
financial viability). This harm is real and perhaps has increased since jury verdicts have
increased in the past two decades. See supra note 78 (discussing the increase in median and
average damage awards over the past fifteen years).
131 See Anderson, supra note 14, at 516 ("For many potential defendants, the most
relevant source of the chilling effect is not the danger of losing a judgment, but the prospect of
having to pay the cost of defending."); Schauer, supra note 123, at 700 ("the costs involved
in securing a successful judicial determination" is one factor which contributes to the overall
chill). In fact, litigation costs make up 80% of the aggregate costs of defense (the remaining
20% covering damage awards and court costs). See supra note 108.
132 The Court did mention the dangers of litigation costs as a deterrent on speakers. See,
e.g., New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279 (noting that truth was an insufficient defense because
it did not reduce the speaker's "doubt whether [truth] can be proved in court or fear of the
epense of having to do so") (emphasis added). However, the Court never returned to the
issue of litigation costs, and did not address how the new standard of "actual malice" would
impact such costs.
133 See Anderson, supra note 14, at 516 (acknowledging the "possibility that the actual
malice rule tends to increase potential verdicts and/or defense costs"); Matheson, supra note
14, at 238, 254-55 (arguing that actual malice is both difficult to apply and costly to litigate);
see also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) (noting that actual malice standard may
escalate costs because of increased discovery).
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actions of the reporters and the editors. Since the Court held in Herbert v.
Lando 134 that there was no privilege from such discovery, the costs of defense
have continually increased, not only in terms of dollars spent on legal defense,
but also in terms of the personnel time of editors and reporters.' 35 Thus, the
Court's adoption of actual malice not only did not promote, but actively
undermined the goal of inexpensive, efficient litigation.
Other examples abound. 136 For instance, by creating independent appellate
review, the Court has made at least one level of appeal typical in all libel cases,
again increasing both the cost and time to get to a resolution. 137 In fact, the only
process alteration mandated by the Court which seems to advance the goals of
speed and inexpensiveness stems from its decision in Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., making summary judgment easier to obtain in libel cases. 138
Ironically, there the Court denied that it was deciding a First Amendment
process case. 139
Instead of promoting speed and inexpensiveness, the Court seems to have
designed a process focused almost exclusively on the last goal-accuracy.
Starting with New York Tines, the Court has focused on the jury trial as the
most significant source of pro-plaintiff error.1 40 At trial, a truth speaker might
134 441 U.S. 153, 158 (1979).
135 See also Anderson, supra note 14, at 516-521 (detailing the numerous factual
questions concerning the action of reporters and editors that are inevitably raised by the actual
malice test).
136 Another example is the Court's decision in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770 (1984), where the Court held that the First Amendment did not limit a plaintiffs
ability to sue in a state where she had never resided and where the defendants had never
worked. See id. at 772-74. Efficiency would have militated in favor of denying jurisdiction in
a state with so attenuated a connection with the subject of the litigation, yet the Court did not
grant any procedural variation based on First Amendment interests. Accord Calder v. Jones,
465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (rejecting claims that the Court should grant a First Amendment
procedural variation because reporters would be chilled by the cost and difficulties of
defending in a jurisdiction remote from where they worked).
137 See supra note 68. Of course the high cost of a libel suit may deter plainfM from
filing suit. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the potential impact on
plaintiffs' willingness to file libel suits if costs decrease).
138 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (discussed in supra notes 36-46); see also Matheson, supra
note 14, at 297 (observing that Liberty Lobby is "attractive from a procedural cost
standpoint"). As discussed infra note 150 and accompanying text, it is arguable that Anderson
focused on accuracy, not speed and efficiency.
139 See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
140 See Schauer, supra note 123, at 705-09 (characterizing Justice Brennan's decision in
New York Thmes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as an effort to decrease pro-plaintiff
error through an alteration of substantive and procedural rules); Matheson, supra note 14, at
236 (arguing that New York Thmes was driven by a fear of error both in the form of inaccurate
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be unable to marshal sufficient evidence to convince a jury of the truth of her
statement or her lack of fault, or the evidence might be confusing and mislead a
jury. 141 With the evidence in equipoise or confused, the jury might erroneously
conclude that the truth speaker should be held liable. Justice Brennan adopted
three reforms to decrease this risk of error, two of which applied to the trial
itself.142 First, he switched the burden of proof (it is the plaintiff who now must
prove falsity and fault).143 Second, he required a high level of proof (clear and
convincing evidence). 144 These twin reforms should decrease erroneous pro-
plaintiff verdicts since a jury that is torn by close or confusing evidence should
hold for the defendant.
The third example of Justice Brennan's effort to improve accuracy was the
adoption of independent judicial review, so that if the jury errs, the appellate
court will overturn the jury's erroneous verdict. 145 This move may also have
addressed Justice Black's more troubling concern, that juries would err not out
of misunderstanding or mis-assessment, but deliberately because of antipathy
for the defendant or the defendant's words.146 Independent review allows
appellate courts to correct any potential errors based on either jury bias or
innocent error.
trial results and in the form of error by the speaker fearing that her tnuthful statements would
be subject to suit).
141 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279 (noting that the defense of truth was
inadequate because of "doubt whether it can be proved in court.. ."); see also Schauer,
supra note 123, at 694-95 (identifying the difficulties of ascertaining the true facts from the
evidence presented in court as a source of error).
142 Justice Brennan also sought to decrease the risk of pro-plaintiff error by altering the
substantive law. For instance, the Court has required all plaintiffs to show fault. See New
York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
143 See New York 7Times, 376 U.S. at 279 (arguing that a defense of tmth "with the
burden of proving it on the defendant" would be insufficient to prevent the deterrence of true
speech because of "the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true").
Justice Brennan also noted that "authoritative interpretations of First Amendment guarantees
have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of tmth ... especially one
that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker." d. at 271.
144 See id. at 285-86.
145 See id. at 285 (noting that the Court must independently examine the record "so as to
assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free
expression").
146 See id. at 294-95 (Black, J., concurring); see also Schauer, supra note 123, at 695
(identifying the "personal prejudices of the judge or jury" as a source of erroneous
determinations). It was this source of error that Justice Black emphasized. Noting the South's
hostility to those who supported desegregation, Justice Black argued that no different verdict
would have been reached "whatever the court had charged the jury." New York Ties, 376
U.S. at 295 (Black, J., concurring).
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Thus, the First Amendment process created by the Court in New York
Times focused on accuracy, specifically the dangers of pro-plaintiff jury error.
It sought to decrease the chance of errors at trial and to reduce the impact of
such errors by ensuring that appellate review caught any anti-speech error that
did occur. Later decisions took much the same track. For instance, in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, the Court
shifted the burden of proof of other elements to the plaintiff (which should
cause juries to err on the side of the defendant). 147 In Curtis and Gertz, the
Court expanded the cases to which the heightened standard of proof applied
(again decreasing the chance of pro-plaintiff error). 148 Also, in Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. and Harte-Hanks Communications,
Inc. v. Connaughton, the Court continued to promote independent appellate
review (perhaps the most effective weapon against trial court inaccuracies).' 49
It is even arguable that Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (the only case to aid
speed and efficiency) is in fact aimed at promoting accuracy since summary
147 See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775, 777 (1986)
(holding that plaintiffs in both public and private figure cases bear burden of proving falsity);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (requiring private plaintiffs to prove
some level of fnult, at least where speech is matter of public concern). In Hepps, the Court
acknowledged that the burden of proof would impact accuracy, and held that the First
Amendment required it to tip that balance in favor of reducing pro-plaintiff errors:
[Ihere will always be instances when the factfinding process will be unable to resolve
conclusively whether the speech is true or false; it is in those cases that the burden of
proof is dispositive. Under a rule forcing the plaintiff to bear the burden of showing
falsity, there will be some cases in which plaintiffs cannot meet their burden despite the
fact that the speech is in fact false, The plaintiff's suit will fail despite the fact that, in
some abstract sense, the suit is meritorious. Similarly, under an alternative rule placing
the burden of showing truth on defendants, there would be some cases in which
defendants could not bear their burden despite the fact that the speech is in fact
true.... Under either rule, then, the outcome of the suit will sometimes be at variance
with the outcome that we would desire if all speech were either demonstrably true or
demonstrably false.... In a case... where the scales are in such an uncertain balance,
we believe that the Constitution requires us to tip them in favor of protecting true speech.
Hepps, 418 U.S. at 776.
148 See Curtis Publishing Co v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending the requirement
of clear and convincing to public figures); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350 (extending actual malice
and its clear and convincing requirement to private plaintiffs seeking punitive or presumed
damages). The Court has prevaricated as to what other elements may or may not trigger the
clear and convincing evidence standard. See supra note 29.
149 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-11
(1984); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685-86 (1989);
see also supra text accompanying notes 81-87 (discussing independent appellate review).
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judgment would prevent jury error from occurring by taking baseless cases
away from the jury. 150
The Court's seeming obsession with accuracy may also explain its refusal
to grant process breaks in Calder v. Jones,151 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc.,152 and Herbert v. Lando.153 If accuracy of result is the sole goal of the
Court in granting process modifications, then Calder and Keeton make sense:
the location where a case is tried, while it may aid efficiency, bears no
relationship to accuracy. Thus, if accuracy was the Court's sole goal, then it
was correct to deny any process break.
An exclusive focus on accuracy may also explain Herbert, where the Court
refused to grant a privilege against discovery into the thought processes of
editors and reporters. 154 As the Court noted, full discovery from editors and
reporters would promote accuracy: "[D]irect inquiry from the actors . . .
suggests that more accurate results will be obtained ... "155 Thus, granting
the process break sought by the press was not only unrelated to accuracy, it
would impede it. In sum, the Court's decisions do reflect a common principle:
an unacknowledged obsession with accuracy as the sole goal of a First
Amendment process. This obsession started in New York Times and explains all
of the Court's later decisions to grant or deny procedural accommodations in
libel cases. 156
150 See supra text accompanying notes 36-46.
151 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984).
152 465 U.S. 770, 772-74 (1984).
153 441 U.S. 153, 158 (1979).
154 See id.
155 Id. at 172-73. The Court continues to stress accuracy, noting that "[i]n resolving the
issue whether the publication was known or suspected to be false, it is only common sense to
believe that inquiry from the author, with an opportunity to explain, will contribute to
accuracy." Id. at 173.
156 My position conflicts with the Court's statement that it cannot perceive any general
rule in its cases. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994). IfI am correct, there are
two possible explanations for the Court's statement: either the Court realizes that it is focusing
on accuracy but refuses to acknowledge it, or it simply has not realized what goal is driving
its decisions. I think the latter explanation is probably (slightly) less insulting to the Court and
has more support in the language of the cases. The Court's repeated citation to and continuing
focus on New York Tines reflects, I would argue, the Court's recognition that New York
Times holds the key to when procedural variations should be granted. The Court's failure to
agree on what the case means reflects its failure to perceive that a search for accuracy was at
the heart of the Court's decision in New York Thnes. See supra note 47 (discussing the
Court's focus on New York TNimes).
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2. The Impact of the Focus on Accuracy
The result of this excessive preoccupation with accuracy is that the Court's
process is severely flawed. It is flawed, first, because, as set out above in Part
ll.B, it has created a process which is costly and slow (hardly a surprising result
given that the goals of speed and inexpensiveness have been ignored, and at
times, undermined). The Court's promotion of appellate review, the most
effective device for ensuring accuracy (yielding high levels of reversal of trial
court errors), is also the most costly in terms of speed and inexpensiveness.
More troubling is that despite the Court's focus on accuracy, it does not
seem to have achieved this goal. For instance, the Court has promoted frequent
use of summary judgment, yet the reversal statistics of trial courts' denials of
summary judgment seem high, suggesting that an unacceptable number of pro-
plaintiff errors (given the goals underlying the First Amendment) continue to
occur. In almost two thirds of cases where the defense moved for and was
denied summary judgment, the denial was reversed on appeal. 157 Thus, trial
court judges are continuing to err in favor of plaintiffs despite the Court's
efforts to create a speaker-friendly summary judgment process. 158
But perhaps the most glaring failure of the Court's procedural
jurisprudence is that the Court's alterations to the trial process have failed to
increase accuracy at trial. The reversal rates on appeal tell us that juries
continue to make errors in a staggeringly high number of cases. We must
question why, given Justice Brennan's focus on reducing trial errors, we still
have outright reversal rates of over 41% of appealed pro-plaintiff verdicts (a
rate which rises to 66 % where the issue is one of actual malice).' 59
One explanation for high reversal rates is that jury bias against libel
defendants, especially the media, continues, and so procedures intended to rein
in juries are, as Justice Black suggested, doomed to failure. Studies
157 See supra note 81. What the statistics suggest is a high pro-plaintiff error rate-not a
high pro-defendant error rate which a First Amendment process calls for. For instance, pro-
defense errors (i.e., where the defense gets summary judgment when it should not) is about
25%; yet pro-plaintiff errors (i.e., where the defense is denied summary judgment when it
was entitled to it) is at almost 34%. See id. If the Court had created an effective First
Amendment process, we would expect to see a much lower pro-plaintiff error rate. See supra
notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
158 Two explanations suggest themselves-both of which are discussed more fully infra
in the context of juries. First, the trial courts may err in interpreting the legal standards-
actual malice is a difficult concept whether you are a trial judge or a jury. See Murchison et
al., Sullivan's Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial Standards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L.
Rev. 7 (1994). Secondly, trial courts may feel an antipathy to the press, causing bias-
intentional or subconscious-against the defense.
159 See supra notes 84, 87 and accompanying text.
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continuously report that the public today dislikes and distrusts the media.' 60
Thus, the high rate of jury errors in trial courts may be a product of jury
antipathy to the press. 161
A second explanation is that some of the substantive positions adopted by
the Court have increased the likelihood of jury error, undercutting the Court's
goal. For instance, the Court apparently failed to realize that the likelihood of
jury error would be materially increased by the Court's adoption of the actual
malice test. Interviews with juries show that they have little comprehension of
the actual malice test.162 This is unsurprising given the Court's own admission
that the term itself is unfortunate and misleading.' 63 To apply actual malice, the
160 See Gla.MOR, POWER, supra note 60, at 16-17 (reporting public attitudes on general
First Amendment issues); Schauer, supra note 123, at 696 (opining that "the public's natural
resistance to unpopular or offensive ideas and opinions, provides a clear but immeasurable
degree of additional built-in error in first amendment cases"); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YAL L.J. 877, 887-89 (1963) (arguing that
suppression, not respect for freedom of speech, comes most easily to the public).
16 1 Over the last seventeen years, juries have found against media defendants and
awarded far higher damages, than in cases tried to the judge alone. See LDRC 1996
Damages, supra note 65, at 9-10.
162 See GiLMOR, POWER, supra note 60, at 17 (citing a Gallup poll that found that the
public "neither understands nor accepts the rationale of 'actual malice'").
163 See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 511 (1981). InMasson,
the Court noted the confusing nature of the term actual malice:
[W]e have used the term actual malice as a shorthand to describe the First Amendment
protections for speech injurious to reputation, and we continue to do so here. But the
term can confuse as well as enlighten. In this respect the phrase may even be an
unfortunate one. In place of the term actual malice, it is better practice that jury
instructions refer to publication of a statement with knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard as to truth or falsity.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.
657, 666 n.7 (1989) (noting that actual malice is "confusing" and the trial court should
instruct the jury in the plain English definition); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199-200
(1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (regretting the choice of the phrase actual malice because of
the confusion it can cause).
In fact these problems with applying actual malice were pointed out by the concurring
Justices in New York lunes itself. Justice Goldberg noted that:
If the constitutional standard is to be shaped by a concept of malice, the speaker takes the
risk not only that the jury will inaccurately determine his state of mind but also that the
jury will fail properly to apply the constitutional standard set by the elusive concept of
malice.
1998] 1795
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
jury must understand that it has nothing to do with malice, 164 yet grasp the
subtle notion that evidence of malice may show actual malice. 165 They must
likewise grasp that while actual malice is greater than negligence, 166 negligence
may be considered in assessing actual malice. 167 A myriad of other nuances
surround our understanding of what is and is not actual malice (e.g., use of
anonymous sources; 168 lying post publication; 169 failure to investigatel70). In
fact, as one recent article points out, the lower courts have developed a detailed
and often contradictory rubric of what it means to have published with actual
malice. 171 If the lower courts cannot comprehend what actual malice means in
any given fact scenario, can we realistically expect juries to do so?172
It seems axiomatic that the more complex the law, the greater likelihood of
error by juries.173 Yet the concept of actual malice is not the only difficult
376 U.S. 254, 302 n.4 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also id. at 293 (Black, J.,
concurring) (opining that "'[m]alice,' even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract
concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove").
164 See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., 491 U.S. at 666 ("It is also worth
emphasizing that the actual malice standard is not satisfied merely through a showing of ill
will or 'malice' in the ordinary sense of the term.").
165 See, e.g., id. at 668 (noting that "it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive
or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry").
166 See, e.g., id. at 666 (rejecting the argument that negligence or departure from
professional standards constitutes actual malice).
167 See, e.g., id. at 668 (holding that evidence of lack of care could be used to prove
actual malice).
168 See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968).
169 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 498
(1984).
170 See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731, 733 (observing that press need not investigate to
avoid liability under actual malice standard); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332
(noting that "mere proof of failure to investigate, without more, cannot establish reckless
disregard for truth"); cf. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., 491 U.S. at 692 (finding actual
malice where newspaper failed to interview a key witness or listen to a tape of the alleged
conversation, thus engaging in "purposeful avoidance of the truth").
171 Murchison et. al., supra note 158, at 106-09 (noting that under the actual malice
standard of New York Tnies courts have created an often contradictory system of journalistic
norms); see also Matheson, supra note 14, at 238 (actual malice is hard for juries to apply).
17 2 See GmLLMOR, POWER, supra note 60, at 16 (attributing the high reversal rate of trial
court judgments to "the fact that juries simply cannot unravel the instructions they get from
the trial judges in libel cases [or to the fact that] trial judges themselves in some cases
inadequately understand the intricate rules of libel").
173 See Schauer, supra note 123, at 695 (noting that "as the legal concepts become more
complex, the probability of error is increased"). Legal complexity may increase chill not just
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concept created by the decision in New York Times. For instance, jurors are
sometimes called upon to determine whether the issue is one of public or
private concern, 174 using a test which again seems an epitome of ambiguity and
vagary. 175 Given the level of complexity of substantive law that the Court has
developed, the risk of unintentional error has significantly increased. Thus,
while attempting to design a process to increase accuracy, New York Times's
changes to the substantive law may have actually increased the likelihood of
jury error.
In sum, the Court has aimed for accuracy, ignoring speed and efficiency.
This in itself has created a seriously flawed process. In addition, the process
changes adopted by the Court have done little to improve accuracy, especially
at the trial court level, leaving the defendants with an error rate that gets the
issue of actual malice wrong in 66% of appealed pro-plaintiff verdicts. 176
Moreover, the most effective tool the Court fashioned to address these
inaccuracies-appellate review-comes at an incredible cost in terms of speed
and efficiency.
by increasing the chance of error but also by increasing the actors doubts as to whether their
conduct is protected, and also by increasing the costs of any litigation. See id. at 698-700.
174 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(holding that the level of constitutional protection depends on whether the speech is on an
issue of private or public concern).
175 The Court's test has been subj&ct to criticism. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S.
at 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority of the Court "provided almost no
guidance as to what constitutes a protected 'matter of public concern'"); Cynthia L. Estund,
Speech on Matters of Public Concern; The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category,
59 GEO WAsH. L. REv. 1, 3 (1990) (noting that the "public concern test ... undermines the
protection of speech that is important to public discourse"); William P. Marshall & Susan
Gilles, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Bad Journalism, in Sup. Cr. REv.
169, 202 n.175. (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1994) (observing that the Court's attempt
to extend protection based on the issue involved in speech is "not without difficulty").
Occasionally juries are asked to distinguish between public officials, all purpose public
figures, limited purpose public figures, and private figures, using a test which academics have
found vacuous and unsupported. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 14, at 526-28 (arguing that
the Court's rationalizations for the public/private figure distinction is "unconvincing");
Frederick Schauer, Defamation and the First Amendment: New Perspectives: Public Figures,
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905 (1984); Marshall & Gilles, supra, at 202-03 n.177 (noting
that it is debatable whether the Court's rationalizations for the public/private figure distinction
is persuasive). However, most courts treat the issue of a plaintiff's status as a question of law
and rarely send it to the jury. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 (1966) (noting
that "in the first instance" it is for the trial judge to determine the plaintiffs status); see also
Anderson, supra note 14, at 501 (observing that "[t]he lower courts almost universally treat
the question as one of law, to be decided by judges not juries").
176 See supra notes 83-87.
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C. Suggested Reforms-A More Balanced Approach
We can draw two radically different conclusions from these procedural
failings. The first is that Justice Black was correct all along-that no amount of
substantive or procedural reform will prove adequate, and thus the abolition of
libel is the only viable option. 177 The second option is to redesign First
Amendment process, this time taking into account the goals of speed and
efficiency. The remainder of this Article takes this second path and advocates
that the Court take a more balanced approach, creating a process responsive to
all three goals.178
As is now obvious, by focusing on accuracy and ignoring speed and
efficiency, the Court has created a procedural system in which most of the
protections occur too late to prevent delay and high costs. Yet, it makes no
sense to force plaintiffs or defendants to go through a trial if appellate review
will reverse the verdict. A better system (one that strives for speed and
efficiency, as well as a reduction in pro-plaintiff error) would weed out cases
where the plaintiff will not prevail early and would use appellate review as only
the last, not the main, weapon to safeguard free speech values. What follows
are proposals for how we can reform First Amendment process, especially the
pre-trial procedure, to better meet all three goals. 179
1. Pleading Rules
The pleading stage seems an appropriate place to begin instituting
procedural safeguards. Numerous jurisdictions require, as a matter of common
law, that the libel plaintiffs plead the exact words of their libel or face
177 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring). I find Justice Black's position, which would abolish libel suits by public officials
on public issues, to be very persuasive. However, a majority of the Court has never supported
this position and the current Court seems wedded to New York Tunes. Thus, this Article will
instead address proposed procedural reforms.
178 A third option, beyond the scope of this Article, would be to alter the substantive law
of libel, for instance, by abolishing the actual malice rule. However, as more than one author
has noted, the Court seems disinclined to alter, let alone abolish the actual malice rule. See
Anderson, supra note 14, at 538 ("The Court has shown remarkable fealty to the [actual
malice] rule and is probably unlikely to abolish it outright.").
179 Rather than reforming the process per se, some scholars have suggested replacing
the current libel action for damages with an action for declaratory judgment, dispute
resolution programs, and no-money, no-fault system. For a review of these proposals, see
Soloski & Bezanson, supra note 55.
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dismissal. 180 This requirement could be adopted as a constitutional process
requirement.1 81
A requirement that the plaintiff plead the exact words which she claims are
defamatory should deter filing by those who have only a vague feeling that they
have been wronged but cannot point to any specific factual error in the article.
Because plaintiffs cannot ultimately prevail if they cannot identify and prove
false specific factual statements, eliminating such claims at the outset would
seem to be more efficient. A specificity requirement, although not immune to
evasion by clever lawyers, would help the trial courts weed out such claims
early in the litigation process.
Although the plaintiff should be entitled to amend her pleadings to meet the
specificity requirement, amendments for the purpose of "shopping for libel"
grossly increases the risk and costs of libel litigation and should be barred. A
classic illustration of such a fishing expedition, in which a plaintiff files suit and
constantly amends her complaint searching for something she can prove is
libelous, was Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.18 2 In Masson, the Supreme
Court noted that the plaintiff repeatedly changed the words he claimed were
libelous until he found some not contained on the tape of his discussion with the
reporter.' 8 3 A constitutional process rule barring such amendments would
greatly decrease the chill on defendants, as the ability of plaintiffs to harass
180 See, e.g., Vantasell-Martin v. Nelson, 741 F. Supp. 698, 707 (N.D. 11. 1990); Rapp
v. Parker, 193 S.W. 535 (Ark. 1917); Des Granges v. Crall, 149 P. 777 (Cal. Ct. App.
1915); Schulze v. Coykendall, 545 P.2d 392 (Kan. 1976); O'Brien v. Walsh, 19 Media Rep.
(BNA) 1511 (La. Dist. Ct. 1991); Ledl v. Quik Pik Stores, 349 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 313 (Mo. Bane 1993);
Tindall v. Holder, 892 S.W.2d 314, 327 (Mo. App. 1994); Missouri Church of Scientology
v. Adams, 543 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. 1976); Geddes v. Princess Properties Int'l, Ltd., 451
N.Y.S.2d 150, 150-51(1982); Federal Land Bank of Baltimore v. Birchfield, 35 S.E.2d 405,
410 (Va. 1939). But see Pursell v. Wolverine Pentronix, 205 N.W.2d 504 (Mich. 1973) (no
special pleading requirements). Other states require specificity as a part of their retraction
statutes. See, e.g., Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D. Fla. 1987);
Gomes v. Fried, 186 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct. App. 1982). At least one federal court has suggested
that specificity in pleading is constitutionally required in First Amendment cases, while others
have suggested that it should be adopted as a matter of federal policy. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
181 As such, the requirement would be binding on all state and federal courts. Cf
Schauer, supra note 123, at 712-14 (criticizing Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San
Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976),
which required specificity of pleading on First Amendment grounds as a double counting that
upset the balance of interest already fornulated by the Court).
182 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
183 See id. at 502.
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through broad accusations and discovery aimed at finding a libel would be
prevented.
The benefits of such reforms are obvious in terms of both speed and
inexpensiveness. They would also further First Amendment goals by limiting
pro-plaintiff errors: Plaintiffs who cannot state a claim promptly, in precise
terms, will see dismissal. The impact on plaintiffs who have valid claims should
not be too severe. Libel law is designed to protect individual reputation from
the impact of a false statement. It does not seem unfair to ask a plaintiff up front
to identify what statements of and concerning her are false and defamatory.
While the plaintiff needs discovery to find out if she can prove actual malice, it
is hard to think why she needs discovery to find out if the information about her
is false. Thus, requiring plaintiffs at the outset to state what is false seems a
reasonable requirement that will serve all three goals of accuracy, speed, and
efficiency.
Such a requirement is easily adopted. Many states already have pleading
requirements in place-thus, the Court would have numerous models to draw
from, building the constitutional process requirement on the basis of states'
experimentations with common law requirements. 184 Moreover, the federal
courts have always required that claims of fraud are to be pled with
particularity, 185 and thus, a requirement of such specificity in libel cases would
hardly prove novel or difficult to apply.
2. Controlling Discovery
A second improvement, which would serve the goals of speed and
efficiency, as well as accuracy, is a reform of discovery. As we have seen,
discovery is one of the most expensive stages in litigation. As long as the
Supreme Court's ruling in Herbert v. Lando'86 stands, a trial court cannot
deny, on First Amendment grounds, a plaintiff's requested discovery of editor's
or reporter's thought processes, conversations, or notes. However, other
process changes could make discovery more efficient. For instance, a
184 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. In addition, federal trial courts already
enjoy considerable discretion to require that plaintiffs reformulate and simplify their claims.
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (empowering the trial court, at a pre-trial conference, to
"take [appropriate] action with respect to ... (1) the formulation and simplification of the
issues, including the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses; [and] (2) the necessity and
desirability of amendments to the pleadings").
185 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
186 441 U.S. 153 (1979). However, as discussed in supra note 25, Herbert can be read
as permitting trial courts to accommodate First Amendment interests, when they exercise
their discretion to supervise discovery.
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constitutional process could control the timing of such discovery. 187 Most
beneficial, because actual malice is the issue that requires most of the discovery
in a libel suit, would be to delay discovery on actual malice until discovery on
other issues such as falsity or common law privileges has been completed and
any motions filed. Thus, if the plaintiff's claim comes up short on other
grounds, there would be no need to grapple with this massive factual inquiry.
Equally, even when it allows discovery on actual malice, the Court could limit
that discovery to diminish the chill. A number of Justices in Herbert suggested
that such a consideration was appropriate.1 88
Once again, these reforms are hardly revolutionary. Most trial courts
already have considerable powers to control discovery. For instance, under the
federal rules, a federal trial court can control the order and scheduling of
discovery.' 89 Equally, the prevention of unreasonably cumulative or
burdensome discovery is a standard part of most discovery rules. 190 Federal
Rule 26 authorizes a federal trial court to prevent repeated depositions, to
preclude multiple depositions if key information has been supplied, and perhaps
to take into account the special First Amendment concern of over burdening the
press because the rule specifically instructs the courts to examine the
"importance of the issues at stake in the litigation."1 9' If these concerns were
constitutionalized, then all state as well as federal courts would have an
obligation to manage discovery to avoid unnecessary costs and vindicate First
Amendment interests.
187 Justice Brennan made a similar suggestion in his opinion in Herbert, proposing that
discovery into editorial discussions be barred until the plaintiff had made a prima facie
demonstration that the publication constitutes defamatory falsehood. See 441 U.S. at 181
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice White rejected this suggestion as likely to create an
expensive, bifurcated system. See i. at 174-75 n.23.
188 See id. at 178-80 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 180-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
id. at 200-02 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 202-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 25, 186 and accompanying text.
189 See FED. R. Crv. P. 16(b), 26(f).
190 See FaD. R. CQv. P. 26(b)(1). Federal Rule 26 allows federal trial courts to limit
discovery if it is "obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive" or if the party seeking the information "has had ample
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought." Id. at 26(b)(1)(i)-
(ii). Most importantly, the trial court can cutoff discovery if "the burden and expense of the
discovery outweighs its likely benefits." Id. at 26(b)(1)(iii).
191 Id. at 26(b)(1)(iii).
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3. Interlocutory Appeal of Summary Judgment
The Court has already promoted summary judgment in libel cases by its
ruling in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.192 The clear and convincing standard
of proof has been applied and issues of actual malice have been held
appropriate for summary judgment.193 However, as we have seen, pro-plaintiff
errors remain-reflected in the high reversal rates of denials of defense motions
for summary judgment.194 To cure this defect, the Court should allow
interlocutory appeals of denials of summary judgment in libel cases. 195
Such a reform would serve process goals. First, it should reduce pro-
plaintiff errors with far less cost and in a shorter length of time. Rather than
reversing, post trial, a case where there was no evidence of actual malice, the
reversal could be immediate-saving plaintiffs, defendants, and the public, the
cost of a trial. Of course, an intermediate appeal would cause delay and some
increased cost in cases in which the trial court had correctly denied summary
judgment-because an additional level of appeal would be inserted into the
process. 196 However, this cost seems justified. First, the cost of a baseless
appeal of a summary judgment motion is much less than the cost of an
unnecessary trial. Second, only a small number of cases would be affected. All
192 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (reversing lower court's holdings because the evidentiary
standard employed by the court was not clear and convincing).
193 See id. at 244; see also supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text. In addition, the
Court has narrowly defined "genuine issues of material fact" to cover only dispute of facts
going to elements of the claim which are of such magnitude that no reasonable jury could find
for the non-moving party. Id. at 247-52.
Moreover, the Court, while taking care not to say that judges can decide credibility, has
called on the trial courts to weigh the quality and caliber of the evidence in determining if
summary judgment can be granted. See id. at 249.
194 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
195 Cy. Anderson, supra note 14, at 541 (suggesting that perhaps interlocutory appeals
would help to secure trial judges' decisions in advance of trial).
Appellate reversal rates for denials of summary judgment would not of course equal post
trial reversal rates. Appellate courts have a tendency to let the plaintiff have her day in court.
Moreover, while summary judgment might not be appropriate in a given case based on the
state of the record at the time of the motion, after a trial the trial record might make apparent
the defense's right to judgment as a matter of law. Equally, while an interlocutory appeal
would be appropriate if the trial court misstates or misapplies the law, it would not be
appropriate when summary judgment is denied because there is a genuine issue of material
fact. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995); infra note 198 and accompanying text.
196 This cost would fall on plaintiffs and defendants alike, because both sides would
have to brief the issues on appeal. However, the increased cost might have a greater impact
on the plaintiff because the defendant (often a media corporation or its insurer) is more able to
absorb increased litigation costs.
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grants of summary judgment are already immediately appealable, as they are
final orders disposing of the case, therefore, the only cases affected would be
denials of summary judgment. Third, the increased cost should be balanced
against the reduction in pro-plaintiff error-an equally important goal of First
Amendment process.
A finding that constitutional concerns mandate an interlocutory appeal is
not without precedent in the federal system. The Supreme Court has already
held that interlocutory appeals are permissible in one area-when the trial court
rejects a claim of privilege by a government official suea under § 1983.197 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed and indeed expanded this holding. 198
One of the rationales for recognizing a right to an interlocutory appeal in
the privilege cases exactly parallels the issues raised in First Amendment
process cases: the costs of discovery and trial. 199 Moreover, some states, New
York in particular, do allow intermediary appeals of summary judgment
denials. 2° ° A review of the appellate reversal rates in this state suggests that the
197 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (holding that a trial court ruling
denying an asserted qualified immunity is immediately appealable).
198 See Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996) (permitting multiple appeals on the
issue of qualified immunity); cf. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 304 (holding that a denial of summary
judgment on grounds that there was a genuine issue of material fact, rather than on the merits,
did not warrant an interlocutory appeal).
19 9 See Mitchell, 72 U.S. at 526-27 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-
18 (1982)). The Court noted that an interlocutory appeal would permit government officials to
avoid the "costs of trial [and] the burdens of broad-reaching discovery." Id.
The move to allow interlocutory appeals in qualified immunity cases followed the same
pattern as the decisions in libel cases. The Court first tried to make summary judgment
effective. In Harlow, the Court expressly attempted to make summary judgment easier for
defendants to obtain by reformulating the substantive test. See 457 U.S. at 815-19. Next, in
Mitchell, realizing that when summary judgment was denied, the officials still faced the costs
of discovery and trial, the Court allowed interlocutory appeals. See 472 U.S. at 526-27. In
libel cases, the Court has already taken the first step-making summary judgment more
available. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). It would seem logical
that if the Court is serious in this endeavor, the Court would inevitably take the second step
and permit interlocutory appeals of denials of summary judgment.
This is not to suggest that the doctrines are parallel. As pointed out in Mitchell, the
entitlement asserted by the defendants is not simply a defense, but a right to "immunity from
suit." 472 U.S. at 526. In libel cases, the claimed right is not an immunity.
On the other hand, the claim to an interlocutory appeal can be viewed as stronger in libel
than in governmental immunity cases. The government official's right to immunity is based
on common law, not constitutional right. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). In
libel cases, the concern for chill, which motivates the demand for an interlocutory appeal, is
of constitutional dimension. Thus, the claim for interlocutory appeals in libel cases may be
stronger.
200 See New York C.P.L.R. § 5701(a) (permitting interlocutory appeals).
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introduction of interlocutory appeals in all libel cases would be profitable. For
instance, there were 22 reported interlocutory appeals of denials of defense
motions for summary judgment in libel cases in New York between 1986 and
1994.201 In 14 of these interlocutory appeals (63.6%), the denial was reversed;
in 6 of these interlocutory appeals (27.2%), the denial was partially reversed;
and in 2 of these interlocutory appeals the denial of summary judgment was
affirmed. 202 In short, 90.9% of interlocutory appeals by defendants of denials
of summary judgment resulted in complete or partial reversal.203 While these
figures are subject to qualifications, 204 they do indicate that interlocutory
appeals would lead to the immediate reversal and dismissal of a high proportion
of cases-saving the resources of plaintiffs, defendants and the system alike.
4. Actual Malice as a Question of Law
One final reform could be adopted, designed to correct the high level of
error at the trial stage could be adopted. The Court could hold that actual
201 This figure, and those cited in the following notes, was obtained by reviewing
the cases reported in LDRC SJ Update, supra note 39, at Appendix B (Summary
Judgment Cases Reported 1986-1994). The LDRC report lists the summary judgment
cases decided in New York between 1986 and 1994. See id. A review of those cases
reveals that 22 of these cases are reports of interlocutory appeals of denials of defense
motions for summary judgment, 14 (63.6%) saw a reversal of the denial of summary
judgment and an additional 6 (27.2%) saw a partial reversal (i.e., there were multiple
claims and the denial of summary judgment was affirmed as to some of those claims and
reversed as to others). Thus, the disturbance rate on interlocutory appeals of denials of
defense motions for summary judgment was 90.9% (combining the reversal and partial
reversal rates). A memorandum listing the cases and detailing the interlocutory appeals
is on file with the author.
202 See id.
203 See id.
204 First, the LDRC statistics include both public and private figure cases. In New York
the standard for private figures is unusually high-gross irresponsibility. See Chapadeua v.
Utica Observer Dispatch, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 569, 571 (1975). In contrast, most States post-
Gertz adopted a simple negligence standard. See FRANKUN & ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA L.
283-84 (5th ed. 1990). Thus, it is possible that the high reversal rate in New York is due, in
part, to this heightened fault standard, and that other states would not see these dramatic
reversal rates following the adoption of interlocutory appeals.
Secondly, New York has one of the lowest rates for trial court grants of summary
judgment, and this may explain the high level of appellate reversals. See LDRC SJ Update,
supra note 39, at 14-15, 18 (noting that New York has a low trial court grant rate and a high
appellate reversal rate)
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malice is a question of law.205 Again, this step is hardly radical. First, the
courts have treated other key libel issues as questions of law. For instance,
whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure is a question of law to be
decided by the court.20 6 Moreover, the Court's holding in Bose that the finding
of actual malice should be independently reviewed by the appellate courts
already treats the issue of actual malice as closer to a question of law than of
fact.207 The reform would also help the Court clear up the confusion created by
its decisions in Bose and Connaughton on how to treat jury findings regarding
the issue of actual malice. 208 Under this proposal, the jury would determine any
disputed facts by responses to special interrogatories. 209 For instance, a jury
might be asked: Did the reporter lie about what a witness said in an interview,
or did an editor change the meaning of the reporter's story? The trial court
would then be required to determine if, given these factual findings, these
actions constituted actual malice. 210
205 Of course, the Court could abolish actual malice, which would result in a drastic
reshaping of the constitutional law of libel. See supra note 178. Here the proposed change is
not to repeal this substantive standard, but rather, to treat it as a question of law-not fact.
206 See supra note 175.
207 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984)
(holding that the issue of actual malice is a question of "constitutional fact" and subjecting it
to a heightened level of appellate review). As one author has noted, the Court never clearly
articulated whether it views the issue of actual malice as a question of fact, law, or mixed fact
and law. See Tigran W. Eldred, Note, Amplifying Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union- The
Proper Scope of De Novo Appellate Review in Public Person Defamation Cases, 57
FORDHAM L. REv. 579, 583 (1989). For the lower courts interpretation of Bose, see supra
notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
208 See Bose, 466 U.S. 485; Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491
U.S. 485 (1984) (discussed at length in supra note 71). For criticism of Bose's reasoning, see
Matheson, supra note 14, at 278 n.365 (opining that the Court's analysis "leaves much to be
desired"); Henry P. Monaghan, Constituional Fact Review, 85 COL. L. REv. 229, 242
(1985) (asserting that the Court's reasoning was simply "backing and filling"); Eldred, supra
note 207 (concluding that the Court's reasoning was unclear, leaving numerous issues to be
resolved by lower courts); and articles cited infra note 211.
20 9 In most cases, there are few disputed facts. Plaintiff is rarely in a position to
introduce evidence to contradict the reporter's testimony as to sources or the editor's
testimony as to editorial changes. Rather, the key dispute is usually whether given these facts,
the defendant's conduct amounts to actual malice. It is this issue that I would propose to make
an issue of law for the Court. Cf Anderson, supra note 14, at 512 (arguing that actual malice
is a "peculiarly jury function" because it requires the drawing of inferences). For a similar
proposal to use special interrogatories, see Eldred, supra note 207, at 596-99, and J. Wilson
Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. REv. 483, 551-53 (1985)
(in government employee speech cases).
2 10 The process of review that the appellate courts now undertake is similar. For
instance in Connaughton, the Court tried to reconstruct the factual finding the jury "must
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This reform seems justified by the high reversal rate of juries on the issue
of actual malice. Moreover, as I have suggested, the high degree of error may
well be due to the complexity of the definition of actual malice. Given this
complexity, asking a jury to decide if actual malice exists is inviting a jury to
err. The advantages of such a reform are obvious. First, it should decrease the
level of error at the trial level on the issue of actual malice. Second, it may
further increase the number of summary judgment motions which are granted,
if it is clear that actual malice is a question of law for the court-thereby
increasing speed and efficiency. Third, it may clarify the Court's confusing and
seemingly contradictory holdings in Connaughton and Bose on how
independent review is supposed to work.211
Those opposed to actual malice being a question of law would cite the
Seventh Amendment and its protection of the role of the jury in civil trials. Yet,
if actual malice is a question of law, there should be no Seventh Amendment
concern.212 Rather, it is the Court's current position-declaring actual malice to
have" reached, and then addressed whether given these facts, actual malice could properly be
found. See 491 U.S. at 690-93.
211 There are several articles for criticism and comment on Bose and Connaughton. See
generally George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 N.W.U. L. REv. 14
(1992; Lucan et al., supra note 70; Matheson, supra note 14, at 271-84; Monaghan, supra
note 208, at 229-76; Eldred, supra note 207; Cathy Parker, Recent Devlopment, Can Civil
Rule 52(a) Peacefully Co-Exist with Independent Review in Actual Malice Cases, 60 WASH.
L. REV. 503 (1985); Gary Anthony Paranzino, Note, The Future of Libel Law and
Independent Appellate Review: Making Sense of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 477 (1986); Sujyot S. Patel, Recent Case, Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton: The Application of the New York Times Standard,
16 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 725 (1989).
212 The Seventh Amendment provides that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VII. As the Court noted in New York imes, 376 U.S. at 285
n.26, this does not preclude the federal courts from deciding issues of law or from reviewing
factual findings in which issues of law and fact are intermingled. See also Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay and Lesbian Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 567 (1995) (citing
Fiske); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-87 (1927); Marc E. Sorini, Note, Factual
Malice: Rediscovering the Seventh Amendment in Public Person Libel Cases, 82 GEo. L.J.
563, 588 (1993).
In addition, some scholars have questioned if the Seventh Amendment even applies to the
actual malice question in defamation cases. See Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of
Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind the Cart, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 3, 40-43 (1985); Eldred,
supra note 207, at n.85. Moreover, as one scholar has noted, the Supreme Court and the
federal appellate courts have not actively enforced the Seventh Amendment for the last twenty
years. See Schnapper, supra note 85, at 353-54 (reporting a "protracted suspension of the
enforcement of the seventh amendment").
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be an issue of fact and yet allowing independent appellate review-that seems to
be a more glaring violation of the Seventh Amendment.213
A second, more profound objection is that allowing the courts to decide
actual malice as a question of law further eviscerates the role of the jury in libel
cases.214 Juries may now be the enemy of the press, but in earlier eras they
acted as the protectors of the press.215 It is a risky gamble to take the jury out of
213 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285 n.26; Bose, 466 U.S. at 498-514
(distinguishing the standard of review of facts under the Rule 52 clearly erroneous standard
from the standard of review to be applied to constitutional facts like actual malice).
214 A third objection would be that issues of law and fact are distinct, and one cannot
simply be declared to be the other. Two rebuttals can be offered. First, some have argued that
the law/fact distinction is fundamentally incoherent-being manipulable at will by the court.
See Monaghan, supra note 208, at 233 (reporting, but rejecting this position). Even if we
accept the distinction, it is clear that the line between law and fact is a policy question-how
to allocate decisionmaking authority between judges and juries. See id. at 235-37; Bose, 466
U.S. at 501 n.17 (noting that where the line is drawn between law and fact "varies according
to the... substantive law at issue" and arguing that some questions of fact are too important
(in terms of impact on future cases and future conduct) to "entrust them finally to the
judgment of the trier of fact"); see also Christie, supra note 211, at 27-28 (discussing
Monaghan's thesis); Keeton, supra note 70, at 1346 (noting that the distinction of law and fact
is as much a matter of allocation as it is of analysis).
As Monaghan points out, there are three, not two, functions: "law declaration, fact
identification, and law application." See Monaghan, supra note 208, at 234. Law declaration
(announcing legal principles) is universally recognized as an issue for the court; and fact
identification inquiring, specifically, into what happened here) is acknowledged as best left to
the jury. However, it is simply a policy choice whether to allocate the "law application"
function (relating the legal standard of conduct to the facts established by the evidence) to the
court orto the jury. See id. at 235-37.
I simply propose that, given the policy considerations discussed above, the "law
application" process of applying actual malice to facts found by the jury be declared a
question of law for the courts. In some sense this is purely semantic, because the Court in
Bose, by calling the issue one of constitutional fact and requiring judges to independently
assess if there was actual malice, has de facto transferred this function to the court. See Bose,
466 U.S. at 485; Monaghan, supra note 208, at 237-38 (noting Bose gives the law application
function on First Amendment issues to the court). However, calling the issue one of law
would, I think, provide the three benefits set out above-encouraging trial courts to grant
summary judgment, allowing the court at trial to simply submit special interrogatories on the
facts and itself assess actual malice, and clarifying the confusion in the Court's opinions in
Bose and Connaughton as to how independent review works. See also Eldred, supra note
207, at 584-93 (suggesting that actual malice be divided into a factual inquiry and a legal
inquiry).
215 For a powerful presentation of this historical argument see Frederick Schauer, The
Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L. REv. 761, 761-69 (1986); see
also Anderson, supra note 14, at 539-40 (noting the past role of juries as protectors of the
press, but concluding that given current public opinion it would be "nostalgic nonsense" to let
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the equation. Yet, I would suggest that independent appellate review has
already effectively done this. The present system gives the impression that the
jury controls the outcome, yet the reversal rates show us a reality in which the
jury's verdict is swept aside again and again on appellate review.216 Would it
not show more respect for the jury to admit candidly what is already a reality:
that actual malice is being decided by the courts, not the jury?
This list of proposed reforms does not purport to be exhaustive, but it does
illustrate that if the Court were to adopt a balanced approach, recognizing that
speed and efficiency are important considerations, then First Amendment
process could be fashioned to benefit defendants, plaintiffs, and the public.
Process protections could be increased at the outset of the law suit and
interlocutory appeals could ensure that the appellate protection already created
by the Court could be accessed with greater speed and economy. In contrast to
the Court's series of ad hoc rulings, it is indeed possible to come up with a
series of reforms that render more rational and improve the process of deciding
First Amendment cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is time to take First Amendment procedure seriously. Instead of
protesting that it has no doctrine to guide its decisions and tacitly creating a
process that promotes accuracy at the expense of speed and efficiency, the
Court should explicitly undertake to determine what goals should be firthered
by a First Amendment process. I would urge the Court to adopt a more
balanced approach and to reform the procedural disaster its ad hoc rulings have
created.
them continue in this role). But see Levine, supra note 212 (advocating further limitations on
jury power in libel cases); Doug Rendleman, Chapters of the Civil Jwy, 65 Ky. L.J. 769,
778-87 (1977) (urging similar limitations in libel cases).216 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing reversal rates in libel
cases). One author reaches a similar conclusion on the need to change the relation of judge
and jury. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 540 (arguing that "[w]e may as well be candid:
constitutional protection of speech against the chilling effects of libel consists primarily of
rules encouraging judges to decide factual matters that previously were left to juries"); c .
Monaghan, supra note 208, at 269-70 (arguing that Bose was erroneously decided and that
there is no justification for independent review in First Amendment cases).
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